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ABSTRACT
The nation's railroads have been confronted with 
persistently declining revenues for some time. In order 
to regain a level of profit which they consider reasonable 
they have instituted recently a program of self-remedy de­
signed to reduce costs through the modernization of equip­
ment and service. The expected gains from technological 
improvements have not been realized generally, primarily
i
because labor costs have remained so high. The railroads 
feel that this anomaly is the result of certain working 
rules which are now so unrealistic and so outdated as to 
be considered "make-work" rules.
It is the primary purpose of this study to deter­
mine the actual costs associated with these rules and the 
effect of these costs on railroad revenue. The major 
methodology is a case study of a representative railroad, 
the Illinois Central Railroad, which involves statistical 
and interviewing techniques as well as personal observa­
tions of railroad operations.
Cost data is presented for the period 1951-1960 
for five specific areas of working rules which have been 
alleged to contain "make-work" characteristics. These are: 
(1) the dual (hours and miles) method of compensation, (2) 
the "consist" or make-up of crews, (3) the payment of 
"arbitraries" or special allowances, (4) the use of graduated 
rate scales according to weight on locomotive drivers or 
number of cars hauled, and (5) monthly wage guarantees.
By substituting the present average speeds of 
freight and passenger trains for the contract speeds estab­
lished shortly after World War I, a savings of nearly five 
million dollars per year is indicated. If the "consist" 
of crews were revised to exclude firemen on freight diesel 
locomotives and one brakeman on all trains, compensation 
for road crews would be reduced further by slightly over 
five and one-half million dollars per year. Elimination 
of the payments for "arbitraries," for graduated weight 
and car-length scales, and for monthly guarantees would 
reduce further the wage bill by somewhat over one million 
dollars annually. Thus, the total annual expense attrib­
uted to these rules is found to be slightly over eleven and 
one-half million dollars per year.
When projected to all Class I railroads, the total 
excess expense amounts to approximately 460 million dollars 
annually. Assuming the railroads were successful in elimi­
nating this expense, the result would be an increase in net 
railway operating revenue of nearly forty-five per cent.
Elimination or modification of these rules depends, 
however, upon satisfactory answers to two important ques­
tions. The first inquires into the validity of the "make- 
work" charges themselves. The analysis reveals that, while 
the dual basis system of compensation and the system of 
special allowances is badly outdated and unnecessarily 
complex, they do not contain significant make-work charac­
teristics. It is recommended that immediate steps be taken 
to overhaul the entire compensation structure, but it is 
recognized that wage scales will need to be revised upward 
at the same time.
Firemen on diesel locomotives and, to a lesser extent, 
some brakemen logically may be removed since it is concluded 
that they perform no necessary function. Transitional or 
terminal assistance is indicated for these employees, how­
ever, and this will tend to offset much of the savings which
theoretically would accrue to the railroads from their 
dismissal.
In general, it is concluded that, while an essential 
starting place for curative action lies in a thorough re­
vision of the compensation structure and in a more efficient 
use of railroad labor, all of the savings indicated in the 
case study would not be forthcoming because of revisions in 
wage rates and terminal pay for eliminated crewmen.
xii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There has been an increasing trend in recent years 
to label transportation a "sick" industry.’1’ Although con­
siderable difficulty has been encountered by the entire 
industry, it would appear that what is usually meant by 
"transportation" is, more precisely, the railroad industry. 
Investigations have concerned themselves most commonly with 
the possible inadequacies of the railroads in performing 
their normal and expected economic functions. In a growing 
and increasingly diverse economy, a soundly financed and 
efficiently operated transportation system is possibly of 
greater import now than ever before. There is also the
■^The language used to express this analogy to human 
illness is sometimes quite colorful; for example: "The
patient is sick. His pulse is slow. His frame is emaci­
ated. His complexion is pallid. He is at death’s door." 
Statement of George Alpert, Chairman of the Board, the New 
Haven Railroad in hearings before the Subcommittee on Sur­
face Transportation, U. S. Senate, Problems of the Rail­
roads , 86th Cong., 2nd. Sess. (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1957), Part I. (Author's note: The
statement was prophetic. In 1961 the New Haven Railroad 
underwent bankruptcy proceedings.)
1
2frequently expressed view that a strained peacetime system
2
may collapse completely under the stress of war.
Government ownership and operation of the nation's 
railroads has often been suggested as being the simplest and 
most direct answer to the railroads' problems. While nation­
alization of transportation is common among western nations, 
this solution has been generally regarded as acceptable 
only as a last resort in this country. The traditional 
opinion is that inasmuch as the problems are basically eco­
nomic in character the approach to them should be economic 
rather than political.
What, then, are the economics of the railroads' 
problems? Perhaps it should be noted at the outset that 
there is no unanimity of opinion regarding the existence of 
a problem at all. If the railroads have resorted to "Madi­
son Avenue" to put their plight before the public, the 
Railroad Brotherhoods have been little less diligent in
An article by Professor Robert W. Harbeson ("Trans­
portation: Achilles Heel of National Security," June 1959
issue of the Political Science Quarterly) based on this 
conviction was placed in the Congressional Record. 86th 
Cong., 1st. Sess., by Senator Andrew F. Schoeppel.
33
their efforts to diminish the existence of such problems. 
While railroad labor's views are understandable in the light 
of the theory of collective bargaining, their conclusions 
are less comprehensible on examination of statistical evi­
dence. This evidence, which is presented in the following 
chapter, indicates quite clearly that the railroad industry 
has been in a general state of financial decline for some 
time. The causes of the deteriorating situation are mani­
fold and extremely complex in nature.
It is self-evident that the basis of the railroads' 
problems is to be found in the consistently declining
3
George M. Harrison, Grand President of the Brother­
hood of Railway Clerks has stated in an address at the Rally 
of Railway Labor in Chicago, November 5, 1959, "I wonder at 
the motives behind this high-powered advertising campaign, 
designed for the railroads on Madison Avenue, New York City, 
to brainwash the American people . . . Based on the volume
of business it is doing, the railroad industry is having 
the greatest period of prosperity it has ever enjoyed . . ."
And again, in an address by G. E. Leighty, Chairman, 
Railway Labor Executives' Association before the Operating 
Railroad Brotherhoods' Education Institute at the New York 
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell U., 
Ithaca, New York, September 21, 1960, it was stated, "The 
facts about railroad earnings are quite different. The 
truth is that the railroads today are not only basically 
sound but they are now enjoying, despite the new competi­
tion from airlines and highway carriers, the most pros­
perous period in their history."
4revenues which they are able to obtain. This is, of course, 
predominantly due to their loss of traffic to competing 
modes of transportation, primarily the loss to the motor 
carriers. Financial distress, however, might still be avoid­
ed, at least in the view of the carriers, if the railroads 
were able to (a) establish competitive pricing based upon 
realistic cost relationships, and (b) take full advantage 
of the cost-saving techniques provided by the technological 
advances in the industry. It has been the allegation of
the carriers that they have generally been unable to uti-
4
lize either remedy. In the first instance the carriers
feel that the Interstate Commerce Commission has been either
reluctant to or unable to adjust their rate-making devices
5
to the rapidly changing transportation situation. In the
Association of American Railroads, Magna Carta for 
Transportation (Washington: Association of American Rail­
roads, 1961).
5Ibid., p. 23. A typical statement made by the 
Association: "It has become increasingly apparent to ob­
jective observers that the massive regulatory growth which 
enmeshes the railroads is not only outmoded in many respects 
but also threatens their ability to survive in a highly 
competitive environment."
5latter case the railroads stress their inability to fully 
implement technological cost savings in the area of labor 
costs which represents slightly over half of their total 
costs. The failure is due, so they maintain, to outmoded 
working rules which they find themselves powerless to cor­
rect through ordinary collective bargaining.6 It is to 
this latter case which the attention of this study has been 
directed. Interagency competition and its associated prob­
lems of rate-making will be referred to in the following 
pages only as they would appear to relate to the current 
revenue problems of the railroads.
The modern concept of railroad working rules have 
ordinarily been traced back to General Order 27 issued by 
the Director-General of the railroads in 1918, This fol­
lowed a study made by the Lane Commission while the rail­
roads were still being operated by the federal government.
C.
James R. Sullivan, et al.. "Why Railroad Feather­
beds Must Go'.," Railway Digest, XIV, No. 4 (April, 1959),
3. A typical comment: "While cutbacks and across-the-
board reductions have been made in nearly every area of 
expenditure, until this year virtually nothing could be 
done about the archaic and sacrosanct union rules which 
annually sluice down the drain hard-earned railroad dollars 
by the hundred of millions."
6It has been the contention of the railroads that there have
been no important changes in these rules from that day to 
7
the present. However, it has been only in the last few 
years that these rules governing wages and general working 
conditions have been increasingly referred to as "make-work" 
rules or, more commonly, as "featherbedding." It seems prob­
able that the derogative reference has arisen largely as a 
result of the completion of dieselizaticn and other technical 
achievements which have tended to render the old rules obso­
lete .
"Make-work" rules have not been clearly defined but 
they appear to refer to rules which require payment for work 
not actually performed or for unnecessary work. On the rail­
roads the carriers have usually referred to rules which have 
retained the World War I speed bases and to certain crew 
make-up rules. Chapter III refers to these rules in detail.
7
Association of American Railroads, Facts About 
Featherbedding in the Railroad Industry (Washington: Asso­
ciation of American Railroads, 1960), pp. 5-6. In support 
of their contention the Association refers to the Report of 
the Emergency Board 109, 1955, quoting as follows: "The
fact that the railroad wage rate structure, for operating 
classifications, has received no comprehensive review for 
more than 30 years, and no systematic study for almost 
twenty years alone suggests that it may well be obsolete 
and ill designed for a modern railroad system."
7It should be emphasized at this point, however, that the 
terms "make-work rules" and "working rules" are not synono- 
mous. Working rules only become "make-work" rules when they 
no longer approximate the general working conditions which 
they purport to adjudicate.
The question must then arise: Why do labor unions
permit or even insist that working rules degenerate into 
"make-work" rules? The answer is unusually complex and 
cannot be adequately treated here but it seems reasonable 
to assume that the underlying cause is as described by Pro­
fessor Slichter when he stated that "the efforts of unions 
to 'make-work' by various methods, direct and indirect, may 
be attributed primarily to the insecurity of employment in
Q
modern industry." The effects of automation and other 
technological advances on total employment are complex 
enough to deserve special attention elsewhere but it may be 
noted that they may have been most keenly felt in the rail­
road industry. This study is concerned not so much with 
causation as with effect but it is freely acknowledged that 
the railroad industry will go far toward a permanent
g
Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial 
Management, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1941),
p. 164.
8solution of its "make-work" problems when greater insight 
is developed into the causes of and the solutions for "em­
ployment insecurity." The immediate question which this 
study seeks to answer is: Would the removal of such rules
or the reasonable modification thereof result in the rail­
roads regaining financial soundness?
Daniel P. Loomis, President of the Association of 
American Railroads, the railroads' chief source of public 
comment, stated in February, 1959, "These outmoded rules
now constitute an immediate drain on the industry in excess
9
of $500 million annually . . . "  This statement and the 
massive attack concentrated on "make-work" rules by the car­
riers suggests the significance which they place on the 
rules. This may be at least partially explained by the 
similarity of the quoted 500 million dollar figure and the
total Net Railway Operating Income for all Class I rail-
10
roads in the United States for the year 1960. 
g
Daniel P. Loomis, Year of Decision: Clear Track
or Crisis? (Washington: Association of American Railroads,
1959), p. 6.
10See Table I, p. 15 infra. This is not, of course, 
meant to suggest that "expense" and "income" are the same 
thing but the relationship to the study is important.
9Further evidence is furnished by the carriers' long 
and finally successful attempt to secure a thorough study 
of "make-work" rules by a Presidential Commission. Such a 
commission was created by an Executive Order of President 
Eisenhower on November 1, 1960. Some of the results of the 
Commission's findings will be analyzed in the final chap­
ters. It should be kept in mind, however, that the Com­
mission consisted of members of rail management and the Rail 
Brotherhoods with the public members in the position of
having to sift through testimony which was frequently con- 
11
tradictory. This is not intended to impugn the validity 
of such findings but suggests that it would be naive to 
assume that further independent research on this problem is 
no longer necessary.
Seemingly, there are at least two questions regard­
ing the railroads' allegations as to the cost of "make-work" 
rules which go to the heart of the problem. The first is
11For example, in testifying as to the "per cent of 
trips on which (engine room) alarms occurred," railroad 
statistics reported 16.1 per cent while the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen survey indicated 46.6 per 
cent. Source: News Letter from the 5 Rail Operating
Brotherhoods (Cleveland: July 21, 1961) .
10
concerned with the validity of the 500 million dollar cost 
figure. This figure has been cited frequently by the Asso­
ciation in public releases the past three years and generally 
challenged by the Brotherhoods as misleading and inaccurate. 
In a more objective sense, one student of railroad working 
rules has observed that, “it is not possible for an outsider
to verify the figure of $500 million from available sta- 
12
tistics."
The second question is concerned with whether or not 
these "excess" labor costs have resulted in average daily 
or annual incomes of rail workers which are significantly 
greater than that of workers in allied industries. If they 
are not, then it seems reasonable to assume that these 
"make-work" rules have been utilized by the Brotherhoods as 
substitutes for demands for general wage increases. If 
this should be the case, removal or modification of these 
rules will not result in financial remedy for the railroads 
as has been implied.
12Morris A. Horowitz, Manpower Utilization in the 
Railroad Industry (Boston: Northeastern University Bureau 
of Business and Economic Research, 1960), p. 55.
11
While it is certainly true that the 500 million 
dollar figure could only be completely verified by a cost 
survey involving all of the nation's railroads (the magni­
tude of which precludes any such survey being made), it is 
the central purpose of this study to provide the bases for 
such verification by a cost study of a typical Class I rail­
road, the Illinois Central Railroad. The railroad was se­
lected only after research revealed that it was truly 
representative. Evidence of this is detailed in succeeding 
chapters. It is believed that valid projections have been 
attained from this study which will go far toward ascertain­
ing the true effects of "make-work" rules on railroad rev­
enue. This study has proceeded on the assumption that until 
more reliable evidence could be secured regarding these 
financial effects, a haze of doubt must necessarily obscure 
the question of the efficacy of any program which seeks to 
solve the railroads' financial difficulties through drastic 
modification of current working rules.
The answer to the second question framed must lie 
more in the realm of conjecture since there is no objective 
method available to determine to what extent general wage 
demands would be utilized in the absence of favorable
12
1
working rules. Nevertheless, it seems almost certain that 
the rail unions would take stern measures to protect their 
level of income. Therefore, it seems both appropriate and 
necessary that the question become a subject of this study.
SUMMARY
A soundly financed and efficiently operated trans­
portation system is essential to productivity, progress and 
the national defense. The railroads continue to constitute 
the major element in that system. Confronted by persist­
ently declining revenues the railroads have long sought 
relief through legislative and Commission action. A recent 
series of rate increases has proved to be of only partial 
assistance. With an increasing sense of urgency the rail­
roads have relied more and more, particularly since World 
War II, on a program of self-remedy through modernization 
of equipment and service designed to reduce costs and regain 
what they consider to be a reasonable level of profits.
In addition to loss of traffic through interagency 
competition and changes in the character of their demand 
schedule, costs have tended to remain high, particularly 
labor costs. The blame, the railroads feel, can be laid
13
squarely at the door of outmoded working rules which they 
allege are now so unrealistic as to be considered "make-work" 
rules. The railroads have charged that such rules have re­
sulted in a half-billion dollars loss each year. This figure 
has not been verified by any outside source and will continue 
to be challenged until some effort is made to ascertain the 
true cost of such rules. An equally important consideration 
is the question of whether or not these rules have been 
utilized by the rail unions to maintain desirable worker 
income levels in lieu of wage increases.
An attempt will be made in the following chapters 
to analyze objectively the actual cost of these so-called 
"make-work" rules through a study of a typical Class I Rail­
road. On the basis of an analysis of the Presidential 
Commission's recommendations and personal interviews with 
both management and members of the organizations, the con­
cluding chapter will review the pragmatic implications of 
possible rule changes.
CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF RAILROAD REVENUE
If the capital acquisition position of a business 
is directly related to profit then, surely, revenue must 
also be the key to profit itself. A consistently growing 
revenue is no less the lifeblood of the railroad than it 
is of any other industry. Conversely, a consistently de­
clining revenue position renders a prognosis which may well 
be ominous.
The General Nature of the Problem
It is clear from a review of Table I that the 
dollar volume of revenue for all Class I"*" railroads in the 
United States has generally declined. Total operating rev­
enues for 1960 amounted to $9,514,066 as compared with an 
average for the past decade of $10,105,895,191, a decrease
■^Effective January 1, 1956, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission revised the classification for Class I railroads 
to include carriers having annual operating revenues of $3 
million or more. Prior to that time it was $1 million.
14
r  A f l  L£ I 
C P E R A T  I N o  R E V E N t .  E  i a  
i 9 5 i - i 9b O
u . a s s  I  r a i l w a y s  o :  t  t i c  L o t t e d  S t a t e s  
( T n o u s a n d  D o * i a r » )
11 i*a 1951 1952 . >3 1954 1-53 * 95b 1957 4958 l 9 59 I960
T o t a l  O p e r a t i n g  R e v e n u e > i u  J9 u  bi . $ 10 3 80 /b 2 S i u  to- ib-J 5 9 )7 u  62 5 i.u iUo J 30 $ iU 3 3 ‘ 1 -  ) 9 1  0 491 J 9o 3 * >b- 368 59 c 25 O b o 5 9 5 14 2 9-
F r e i g h t  R e v e n u e 0 b ju .ui d 7 68 b 35 3 -00 5-2 ; 79 7 8 o5 3 53 8  2fio 3  9 3. - 2 J 0 * 2 a 3 1 1 3 U ' 4' o2t 8 3 i2 1 8 . 0 o 25 -23
P a s s e n g e r  R e v e n u e 9uu 9uo ; 8 j 34 i 9b2 7b 7 283 742 9 u 3 '30 302 7 33 339 b ' 3 2 9 6 o5i 166 0 4 0  2 66
A i l  O t h e r  R e v e n u e 0 3 6 2 0 1 d d 3 <-2 fi71 633 3 0 5  65 7 6 2 5  09 * 8-2 M o oc; 34 u 3 . 8  - 4 5 66 1 7 1 i 8 46 603
T o t a l  O p e r a t i n g  E x p e n s e s i - 4 b  ut;-} 9 502 542 * 3 34 769 8 - * b 807 8 9 7o 3 J 3 9 - 82 C M 9 36 9 0 3 0 0 iv/4 2-2 9 u7 7 384 8 930 2/3
S e t  R a i l w a y  O p e r a t i n g  I n c o n e 5 i u l  3-2 $ i 0 7 8  2 20 S 1 109 4 00 S 8 7 4  0 1 8 5 1 127 997 $ 1 O 60 2-o 5 922 J 34 $ -b2 2 90 S 74 7 6 7b $ 584 Oio
t r a n s p o r t  S t a t i s t i c s  i n t tie tn  t ted 3 ta t e s . Y e a r s  1 3 5 0 * 1 9 b O . A n n u a l  R e p o r t s  01 the I n t e r s t a t e  Coutoerce Cocsnission { - a s l u n g t o n :  I n t e r s t a t e  Consaerce C o a m i s s  ion) .
I—1 
Ln
16
of well over a half-billion dollars from the average. This 
is even more discouraging in the face of the fact that the 
year 1959 had indicated an approximately quarter-billion 
dollar gain over the previous low-point for the past five 
years of the decade in 1958.
Total operating revenues are a crude measure of 
financial health and, in this instance, reflect only a minor 
(5.86) per cent decline for 1960 over the ten-year average.
Of far more significance, however, is the decrease in net
railway operating revenue which reflects the operating income 
of the railroads after deductions have been made for normal 
expenses but not for fixed or miscellaneous charges. Table 
I indicates these changes and the Net Railway Operating 
Income for the past ten years. Thus, Net Railway Operating
Income for 1960 was $584,033,571 as compared to an average
for the past decade of $928,670,193, or a 37,12 per cent 
decline for 1960 from the ten-year average. This more 
dramatic evidence of the deteriorating revenue position of 
the railroads is due to expenses remaining about the same 
or increasing slightly while total operating revenue is 
declining.
17
A more detailed analysis of the revenue position of 
Class I railroads (Table I) reveals that while freight rev­
enue had declined on the average for the decade about 1.38 
per cent per year, passenger revenue had decreased about 
3.93 per cent per year for the same period. As freight con­
stitutes the bulk of the traffic, however, the absolute 
value of the decline is much more significant. Mail, ex­
press and "other revenue" has generally been more consist­
ent and renders a more optimistic outlook. Figure 1 depicts 
these secular decreases in graphical form.
Sources of Declining Revenues
Declining revenue in the railroad industry may be 
traced directly to decreases in freight carloadings and 
passengers carried since these obviously are the principal 
sources of revenue. Perhaps not quite so obvious is the 
relationship between declining revenues and changes in the 
kind or quality of the traffic over a period of years. The 
former is to be attributed almost entirely to interagency 
competition, the latter to more subtle and less easily 
measured phenomena such as service, speed, or changes in 
taste. The last will be more fully discussed later.
18
OPERATING REVENUE AND EXPENSES
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
TTgOS'B 1.
—  Total Operating Revenue 
. —. Total Operating Expense
x ~  Freight Revenue
Net Rail Operating Income 
All Other Revenue
O —  Passenger Revenue
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Table II reveals, as it might be expected to do, an 
emerging pattern similar to that found in Table I (Operating 
Revenues). Carloadings of revenue freight declined rather 
markedly during the decade under study, but not as precipi­
tously as revenue passenger-miles. Freight carloadings 
were down in 1960, 13.83 per cent below the average for the 
ten-year period. This is far in excess of the percentage 
decline in freight revenue as already noted in Table I.
This is probably due to the partial success of the railroads 
in applying to the Interstate Commerce Commission for 
freight rate increases during the period.
It has been estimated by the Commission that "the
cumulative increases in rates authorized (between June 30,
1946 and September 9, 1958) averaged 119.0 per cent for
eastern district, 103.0 per cent for Pocahontas region,
108.3 per cent for southern region, 106.7 per cent for
western district and 112.1 per cent for all districts and
2
regions combined." Minor freight rate increases were also
2
Transport Economics (Washington: Bureau of Trans­
port Economics and Statistics, Interstate Commerce Com­
mission, September, 1958), p. 4.
Also see:
Increased Rates, Fares and Charges, 1946, 264
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proposed by the railroads in 1960 which it was estimated
would further increase freight revenues by about 1.7 per 
3
cent. The net results of these activities has been to 
moderate the general decline in freight revenue over the 
period but the continuous loss of freight traffic has none­
theless rendered the carriers' position a precarious one.
Revenue passenger-miles (Table II) declined 23.72 
per cent in 1960 from the average, 1951-1960. Unlike 
freight carloadings, revenue passenger-miles indicated a 
decrease each year over the previous year for the period.
In spite of an average annual increase of 0.041 cents per 
passenger-mile revenue over the ten-year period, passenger 
revenue decreased from $900,238,679 in 1951 to a new low
I.C.C. 695, 266 I.C.C. 537
Increased Freight Rates, 1947, 269 I.C.C. 33, 270 
I.C.C. 81, 270 I.C.C. 93, 270 I.C.C. 403
Increased Freight Rates, 1948, 272 I.C.C. 695, 276
I.C.C. 9
Increased Freight Rates, 1951. 280 I.C.C. 179, 281 
I.C.C. 557, 284 I.C.C. 429
Increased Freight Rates, 1956. 298 I.C.C. 279 
Increased Freight Rates. Eastern and Western Terri­
tories . 1956, 299 I.C.C. 429 and 299 I.C.C. 557
3
Association of American Railroads, A Review of 
Railroad Operations in 1960. Special Series No. 95 (Washing­
ton: Association of American Railroads, 1961), p. 13
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of $640,268,064 (Table I) in 1960 indicating a more rapid 
decline in revenue passenger-miles than could be offset by 
periodic fare increases, One authority has suggested that 
"competitive conditions in recent years have so limited the 
passenger fares that can be charged that it is generally
considered impossible to eliminate the passenger deficit by
4
raising fares."
A Commission study for the year 1959 illustrates 
this situation. Three railroads of thirty-seven studied for 
that year reported passenger deficits in excess of freight 
net railway operating income; twelve reported deficits be­
tween fifty and one hundred per cent of freight net railway 
operating income and sixteen reported passenger deficits up 
to fifty per cent of the net railway operating income from
freight service. Three railroads reported profits for pas-
5
senger service. It has been frequently pointed out, however, 
that these deficits are due in part to the formula prescribed
4
D. Phillip Lochlin, Economics of Transportation.
5th Ed. (Homewood, 111.; Richard D. Irwin, 1960), p. 342
£
Transport Economics, o p . cit., May, 1960, pp. 2,3
by the Commission for computing costs for passenger service.^
It has been suggested that such costing methods include
joint or common costs which in many instances would be in-
7
curred by the roads even if the service were abandoned. 
Although there has been little consistency in defining pre­
cisely what is meant by "compensatory" this is the term 
frequently used by the Commission to suggest costing pro­
cedures which result in rates which cover all costs including
g
some return on net investment. Aside from these very com­
plex and sometimes very abstract considerations regarding 
accounting methods it seems clear that passenger traffic 
has generally been unprofitable and may be placing an undue 
burden on freight revenues.
A comprehensive account of the formula may be 
found in a report entitled, Avoidable Costs of Passenger 
Train Service (Cambridge: Research Committee of the Aero­
nautical Research Foundation, 1957). Also see: Meyers,
et al., Competition in the Transportation Industry (Cam­
bridge: Harvard U. Press, 1959)
An excellent discussion of the problem may be 
found in G. W. Wilson, "Current Criticism of the ICC,"
Current Economic Comments. XXI (August, 1959) .
8For a critical analysis, see: Ernest W. Williams, 
Jr., The Regulation of Rail-Motor Rate Competition (New 
York: Harper, 1958), Chapter III
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Long-Run Implications of Declining Revenue
The problem of most pressing importance to the rail­
roads resulting from declining revenues is the disturbing 
influence which it exerts upon working capital. Working 
capital represents the cash available for current operating 
expenses. Table III depicts the steady and serious decrease 
for the last half of the decade previously examined. The 
working capital (less material and supplies) on December 31, 
1960 was $560,700,000 only 82.13 per cent of the average 
for that date for the five years studied. This was con­
siderably less than the $703,294,000 total railway operating 
expense for the following month of January, 1961. Thus, 
working capital, excluding any prorated share of material 
and supplies, failed by over one hundred million dollars to 
meet the following month's necessary outlay of cash. It 
has been stated that this situation tends to force distorted 
economic decisions on the railroads which may have far- 
reaching results.^
g
The President of the Pennsylvania Railroad empha­
sized this fact in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee 
on ~Problems of the Railroads, 1957, o p . cit. , p. 127, stat­
ing that the long-run effects of inadequate working capital, 
including: (a) liquidation of assets, (b) elimination of
25
WORK I NO l A  P I I' A  L - i T R R E N T  AS SKIS A N D  L I A B I L I T I E S *  
I ' l a s . t  I R a i i i e a d s  e  l : It s* I ' n n  I ' d  S t a  t e  n
i A i. . - ! Di’t ero6 ft t . s ; )
( 1 inmsands ot Do l lars)
I I em 1 i Sb 1*57 1*58 1*5* 1*60
Current asaets--Tntal 51.512 -2; $ 1 180 872 51 11U **6 SI 15* 856 $2 *08 842
C/j sh 8-6 87 5 7 lb -53 bib 50* 550 705 483 613
Temporary cash Investments *b8 : io 82* 32 1 *85 **0 1 1U2 660 *52 6*7
Materials and supplies ■ »- 02 0 71 1 *-7 582 7*8 558 260 551 774
All ot her * 8 i ) 22 *2) 151 *2b 6** *48 231 *20 758
Current Llab11i tIes--To t a I : 0*5 4 5b 1 *13 6 50 I 721 *85 1 812 674 1 7*6 368
Accounts payabIe l 154 3 8* 1 08* 54 7 *50 5 11 1 004 652 1 050 1*8
Taxes accrued 64 0 625 544 308 472 448 510 *21 44 3 84*
All ot her 100 *42 2 7* 7*5 2** 006 2*7 101 302 321
W o r M n g  capitol-*Net ; u u> *; i 1 267 22 2 1 18* Oil 1 34 7 182 1 1 12 474
Per cent increase over previous
per 1 od d . 10.- d . 11.8 15. 1 d . 3.0 d . 17.4
NET WORKING CAPITAL (less material
and supp11es) 5 702 -*>1 $ 555 2 75 5 806 213 S 788 *22 $ 560 700
Per cent increase over previous
period d . 2 5 . 1 d . 2 1.0 63 .6 d . 2 . 1 d. 28.*
♦Source: Transport Economics, Monthly Report ot the Bureau of Transport Economics, (Washington:
Interstate Commerce Commission, January, 1*57-61).
d Decrease
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In the minds of some, the most significant aspect 
of declining revenue lies in the effect it may have upon 
the individual company's ability to raise capital for tech­
nological improvements which are so necessary to meet the 
increasing threat of interagency competition. The usual 
methods of attracting capital are available to the railroads, 
but they have historically relied more heavily on the sale 
of debt than most industries. One of the significant re­
sults of this policy is the fact that in recent years 
maturities on equipment obligations alone have averaged 
nearly a half-billion dollars annually. For this and other 
reasons the railroads have followed the recent trend of 
American business in utilizing retained earnings for capi­
tal investment.
necessary capital expenditure for efficient operation, and 
(c) deferred maintenance constituted, "the most costly 
thing that can happen for the long-run pull, particularly 
in an inflationary economy . . . "
10Daniel H. Brill, "Financing of Capital Formation," 
a report prepared by the National Bureau of Economic Re­
search entitled, Problems of Capital Formation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 147-192
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It seems to be axiomatic that capital acquisition 
goes hand-in-hand with the ability to retire bonds as they 
mature, pay interest on existing indebtedness, pay dividends 
on outstanding ownership and provide net revenues for in­
ternal financing. The measurement of this ability is return 
on investment after depreciation. Table IV indicates the 
general decline in this important measurement of financial 
health. It may be noted from the next to last column that 
dividends have generally held more firm for the ten-year 
period under study than would normally be anticipated. 
However, the difficulty confronting rail management may be 
noted from the last column which depicts the percentage of 
net income used annually for the payment of cash dividends. 
Increasingly, less and less is left for retained earnings. 
One of the most careful observers of railroad problems has 
noted:
Large annual sums of retained net income are clearly 
essential if railroads are to continue high rates 
of gross capital expenditures in future years. For 
equipment obligation maturities will continue high, 
and the sale of stocks or bonds other than equip­
ment obligations may not be feasible. Consequently 
the rates of return earned by the railroads will 
have great significance to shippers and travelers
TABLE IV
RETURN ON NET INVESTMENT AND CASH DIVIDENDS PAID - 1951-19603 
Class I Railroads of the United States
Year
Per cent 
Return 
on
Net Investment
Net 
Income 
(Thousand Dollars)
Total
Cash
Dividends
Declared
Per cent of 
Dividends 
to Net 
Income
1951 3.76 $693 176 $328 478 47.30
1952 4.16 825 396 338 065 40.95
1953 4.19 903 227 382 282 42.32
1954 3.28 681 690 374 344 54.91
1955 4.22 927 122 447 434 48.26
1956 3.95 876 333 431 562 49.24
1957 3.36 737 431 426 515 57.83
1958 2.76 601 737 372 482 61.73
1959 2.72 577 719 403 238 69.79
1960b 2.13 444 657 n.a. n.a.
Association of American Railroads, Railroad Transportation; a Statistical Record. 
1921-1959 (Washington: Association of American Railroads, 1960), p. 16.
^Association of American Railroads, A Review of Railroad Operations in 1960 
(Washington: Association of American Railroads, 1961), Special Series No. 95, p. 13.
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as well as to rail stockholders.
Causes of the Deteriorating Situation
Some insight may be gained into the problems which 
this study contemplates by a brief review of the derivation 
of the current financial plight of the railroads. Tech­
nological advances have proved to be a two-edged sword for 
the railroads. On the one hand they created a rail service 
which is safer and infinitely more efficient. On the other 
hand it has created competitive forms of transportation 
dangerous to its own existence. The two might offset each 
other if it were not for the fact that the rate of diminish­
ing average unit costs on the railroads have not kept pace 
with their loss of traffic. Thus, profits have declined 
gradually but persistently since the advent of competing 
forms of transportation.
The railroads believe that this situation has de­
veloped as a result of labor costs increasing while total
11James C. Nelson, Railroad Transportation and 
Public Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1959), p. 221. For a scholarly and somewhat detailed dis­
cussion of rail earnings and capital formation, see:
Chapter 7.
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employment was significantly decreasing. The following 
chapters will attempt a close analysis of this problem. A 
brief historical survey of interagency competition may 
reveal, however, why this problem has become so critical.
It should be noted at this point that the entire analysis 
thus far has only general validity. Some regions fare 
better than others; some individual railroads, particularly 
in the Pocahontas region, have consistently maintained high 
levels of profit. Reference throughout this study, however, 
will continue to be to the railroads as an industry.
Loss of revenue from interagency competition. The 
railroads1 problems may have begun as early as a half- 
century ago when their near-monopoly position in the nation's 
transportation system was challenged by new methods of car­
riage, particularly by highway motor carriers. One of the 
closest students of transportation problems has observed 
that, "the most pervasive and deep penetration into traffic
provinces once held by the railroads has been made by the
12
motor carriers." By 1920 the adaptability of the motor
■^Williams, o p . cit. . p. 1.
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carrier to intercity traffic was becoming quite clear. Ease 
of entry, faster service and the use of publicly constructed 
and maintained ways resulted in the growth of the motor car­
rier industry which was unhindered by government regulation 
13until 1935. Attempts at integrated rate regulation since 
that time by the Interstate Commerce Commission did little, 
however, to solve the railroads' basic problem which was the 
continuously increasing loss of high-rated traffic to the 
motor carriers. The motor carriers had a service to sell 
which is the fast, efficient transportation of highly-rated 
merchandise, and they continued to sell it in increasing 
quantities. Their success in handling top-graded traffic 
is clear from a study of Table V which illustrates the cents 
per ton-mile revenue of common carriers versus that of Class 
I railroads for the period, 1950-1959. Since 1954 the rail­
roads have consistently received less than one-fourth of 
the cents per ton-mile revenue of that of the Class I Common 
intercity motor carriers.
13One of the clearest, brief accounts of this growth 
and the need for regulation, and an explanation of the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1935, may be found in Locklin, o p . cit.. 
Chapter 31.
T A B L E  V
TON-MILE REVENUE 
AND CLASS
OF CLASS I COMMON MOTOR 
I RAILROADS, 1950-19593
(C/ton-mile)
CARRIERS
Class I All Rails as
Common Class I Percent of
Year Motor Carriers Railroads Mo tor
1950 5 .009 1 .329 26.8
1951 5.174 1.336 26.2
1952 5.615 1 .430 26.0
1953 5.732 1.478 26. 1
19 59 5 .826 1.420 24.7
1955 5.798 1.370 24.0
19 56 5.968 1.384 23.5
1957^ 6. 135 1.445 23.6
19 5 8 c 6. 186 1.463 23.9
Ln ■*L> r. 6.277 1.44 5 23.4
aSource: Transpor t Economics, Monthly Report of 
the Bureau of Transport Economics, (Washington: Interstate 
Commerce Commission, February, 1961), p. 11.
'’Class I classification changed in 1957 from Motor 
Carrier revenue of $200,000 to $1,000,000 annually.
cPreliminary figures.
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Such figures reflect not only the loss in total
freight traffic by the railroads over the period under study
but the additional loss to revenue by the gradual change in
the class or kind of freight traffic. This change is most
clearly noted from a review of revenue freight cars loaded
of Miscellaneous from 1951-1960 (Table II). The carloadings
in this important category decreased from 19,839,994 in 1951
to 15,706,958 in 1960, a decline of 21.94 per cent. Nelson
has observed that "because those commodities generally take
rates that are high in relation to rail unit costs, volume
diversion of manufactures and miscellaneous goods has had
14
a seriously adverse effect on railroad earnings."
One of the gravest concerns of rail officials, 
however, in the past decade has been the encroachment by 
the motor carriers into those areas of transportation long 
thought to be the exclusive domain of the rails. This is 
the bulk, low-rated, long-distance traffic which would 
normally be considered to be more efficiently transported 
over rails. The diversion of this kind of traffic to the 
motor carriers has even more long-run implications to the
14Nelson, o p . cit. , p. 34.
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rail carriers than the loss of the highly-rated manufac­
turing and miscellaneous commodities mentioned above.
The key to this problem lies in the rate regulatory 
powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The railroads 
feel that they could recapture and retain this type of traf­
fic if they were permitted to reduce rates in direct rela­
tion to costs. The Commission, on the other hand, at 
present is required by law to preserve all forms of trans­
portation in keeping with the national transportation policy. 
The problems associated with this seeming paradox are so 
unusually complex as to require separate and careful study.
The above discussion represents only a very casual 
approach to the many problems associated with interagency 
competition and its purpose was to create an awareness of 
the fact that the subject of this study is only one of the 
important problem areas which requires careful and immediate 
attention.
SUMMARY
In summarizing the current revenue position of the 
nation's railroads it may be fairly stated that the situ­
ation is generally very discouraging. Direct causes appear
35
to be (a) consistently declining freight carloadings and 
revenue passenger-miles, (b) resulting declines in working 
capital which tends to create economic decision-making 
based upon expediency rather than long-run planning, (c) in­
ability to finance capital expansion through retained 
earnings, and (d) a rate structure which will not permit 
the carriers to regain traffic lost to competitive modes of 
transportation. Confronted with this situation the rail 
carriers have attempted to improve or at least maintain 
their financial position through improvement in transporta­
tion techniques, primarily those concerned with cost reduc­
tion .
Having established the current financial environment, 
the remainder of this study will be concerned with probing 
the railroads' allegations that outmoded working rules have 
prevented them from regaining a sound financial structure 
through cost-cutting efficiencies.
CHAPTER III
ORIGIN AND MEANING OF "MAKE-WORK" RULES
Formal, written working rules have emerged in nearly 
every industry in response to the need to delineate the re­
sponsibilities and obligations of both labor and management. 
Perhaps the most urgent need from the standpoint of the 
worker is, as Slichter has suggested, "protection against
1
the arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion of management." 
Arbitrary action, however, is not limited to management and 
there is equal need for a set of rules to protect the com­
panies against capricious conduct. Finally, a rational and 
realistic set of rules encourages greater day-to-day opera­
tional efficiency. One authority has argued that management
only becomes concerned with working rules "when these rules
2
are obsolete, thereby retarding output and efficiency."
^■Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial 
Management (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1941)
P . 2 .
2
Jacob J. Kaufman, Collective Bargaining in the 
Railroad Industry. (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia
U. , 1954) p. 27 .
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Railroad management has in recent years indicated consider­
able concern with the working rules in their industry. In
no other industry can working rules be found which are so
complex and so outdated. The problem is further complicated 
by the fact that there is probably no other industry in 
which the need for a thorough revision is so urgent. The 
latter is due, of course, to the persistently declining fi­
nancial health of the railroad industry. On the other hand
there is no other industry in which labor is confronted
with the decline in the working force to the extent in which 
it is to be found in the railroad industry. This decline 
may be noted from Table VI which indicates a decrease of 
nearly one-half million employees in the decade 1951-60, 
alone. Changes in technology form the underlying causes for 
the decline but the result is a conflict situation in which 
on the one hand rail management is keenly desirous of re­
vising the working rules to correspond more closely with 
present day technology while, on the other hand, the rail 
labor organizations are willing to modify the rules only if 
the result will maintain present employment.
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TABLE VI
EMPLOYEES AND THEIR COMPENSATION* 
Railroads o£ Class 1 In the United States 
Calender Years 1951 to 1960
Year
Number of 
Employees
Per cent 
Decrease Over 
Previous Period
Average 
Week ly 
Compensat ion
Per cent 
Increase Over 
Previous Period
1951 1 276 000 $ 80.20
1952 1 226 663 4.0 83.23 3.6
1953 1 206 312 1.7 84.68 1.7
1954 1 064 705 13.3 87.45 3.2
1955 1 058 216 .6 90.50 3.4
1956 1 042 664 1.5 97.67 7.3
1957 986 001 5.7 104.22 6.3
1958 840 575 17.3 112.48 7.3
1959 815 474 3.1 117.27 4.1
1960 780 494 4.5 119.91 2.2
Average
Change
Annua 1 
Over Decade 5.2 3.9
Total Change 
1960 Over 1951 38.8 49.5
*Source: Association of American Railroads, Statistics of 
RalIroads of Class 1^ ^n the United States. 1950- 19b0 (Washington: 
Association of American Railroads, August, 1961), p. 3.
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The Origin of Railroad Working Rules
Negotiated working rules may be traced back as far
as 1875 when an agreement was concluded with the New York
Central and its engineers. A fireman agreement was signed
by the Illinois Central in the following year. Conductor
and trainmen agreements were concluded somewhat later, the
3
first such set of rules dating from 1891. These early 
agreements were comparatively simple in character and gener­
ally concerned themselves only with basis of pay considera­
tions. However, by 1911, the Chicago, Milwaukee and St.
Paul concluded an agreement with its engineers which 
contained forty distinct sections. These more complex 
agreements covered rules governing employment in addition 
to those dealing with methods of payment.
An event of unusual significance occurred in 1916 
with the passage of the Adamson Eight Hour A c t . The act
3
The above has been generally adapted from: William
Z. Ripley, "Railway Wage Schedules and Agreements," Report 
of the Eight-Hour Commission, U. S. House of Representative, 
65th Congress, 2nd. Sess. (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1918), pp. 269-271.
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stipulated:
That beginning January first, nineteen hundred and 
seventeen eight hours shall, in contracts for labor 
and service, be deemed a day's work and the measure 
of a standard of a day's work for the purpose of 
reckoning the compensation for services of all em­
ployees who are now or may hereafter be employed by 
any common carrier by railroad . .
The act resulted from a demand by the Brotherhoods
for an eight-hour day which had been summarily dismissed
by the companies. The threat of a nationwide strike then
induced President Wilson to ask Congress for the passage of
legislation to insure the eight-hour day in the railroads.
The carriers immediately challenged the constitutionality
of the act but it was upheld by the Supreme Court, most
notably in the case of Wilson v. New in which the Court
noted that the right to collective bargaining "affords no
ground for saying that legislative power does not exist to
protect the public interest from injury resulting from a
5
failure to exercise that private right."
A few months later the railroads were seized by the 
federal government under war-time powers granted to the
4
39 Statutes at Large, 721 as quoted in Ibid., p. 4. 
5243 U.S. 332 (1917) .
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President and were placed under the direction of W. G. 
McAdoo, who was named Director General. He then named a 
commission, frequently referred to as the "Lane Commission" 
to study wages and working conditions on the railroads. As 
a result of this study McAdoo issued General Order 27 which, 
in addition to acknowledging the existence and legality of 
the eight-hour day, granted increases in wage rate and im­
provements in working conditions. Subsequently, a number
of nationwide agreements were signed with various labor 
6
organizations. A careful student of railroad labor legis­
lation has observed that "it was during this period that 
the railroad labor organizations made considerable progress 
in securing new rules and broad interpretations of existing 
rules (and) . . . the precedents established on many rail­
roads were carried over and still exist in a large number
7
of agreements in force today." As already noted, this is
g
an opinion with which the railroads concur today.
^Wayne L. McNaughton and Joseph Lazar, Industrial 
Relations and the Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954),
P. 105.
^Kaufman, o p . cit., p. 29.
^Facts About Featherbedding in the Railroad In­
dustry , loc. cit.
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Following return to private ownership a Railroad
Labor Board composed of nine members was created by the
Transportation Act of 1920 to adjudicate labor disputes.
The Board was not a success largely owing to the failure of
9
Congress to utilize mediation. Dissatisfaction on both 
sides led to the passage of the Railway Labor Act of 1926. 
Workers were somewhat more successful in extending the rules 
in their favor after the passage of this act than they had 
been in the previous six years under the act of 1920.
A series of amendments to the Railway Labor Act of 
1926 were passed by Congress in 1934. One such amendment 
was to become particularly influential in the codification 
of working rules into their present day form. This amend­
ment provided for the creation of a National Railroad Ad­
justment Board which is an "administrative tribunal 
empowered to render judicially enforceable decisions in 
controversies arising out of interpretation of collective 
bargaining agreements between rail carriers on the one hand
^National Mediation Board, Twenty Years Under the 
Railway Labor Act. Amended. 1934-1954 (Washington: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1955), p. 90.
and the representatives of their employees on the other."
The Board consists of four divisions. The first division, 
which will be of primary concern to this study, has juris­
diction over train and yard service workers such as engineers, 
firemen, trainmen, conductors, hostlers, and yard service 
employees. The division consists of ten members and all 
divisions are headquartered in Chicago. From 1934 through 
1957, nearly fifty-thousand cases were d o c k e t e d , i n d i c a t i n g  
the extent to which the services of the Board have been used.
A Referee may be appointed to make an award in the event of
12
the failure of the Board to render a decision.
The carriers have contended for some time that the 
Board has to all practical purposes, "completely changed the 
entire meaning and effect of many rules and practices of 
long standing, and has immeasurably increased the control 
of the Organizations over railway operations and the feather­
bedding incident to the application of the Operating Em-
13
ployees Rules." An example of this new meaning
■^National Mediation Board, Administration of the 
Railway Labor Act by the National Mediation Board, 1934-1957 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 27.
11Ibid., p. 28.
12Ibid., p. 29.
•*-3Transcript of the Proceedings of the Emergency
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given to the rules by the Board is that of the fifty cents 
permitted a crewman when he couples air hoses at points 
where carmen are employed. The Board evidently has felt 
that this is a task which is over and above his regularly 
assigned duties and is a duty regularly assigned to carmen. 
At points where a carman is not on duty no such payment is 
made and the task is thus regarded as an emergency proceed­
ing. Numerous such decisions have been rendered by the 
Boards over the objections of rail management who have gen­
erally contended that they remove the discretionary power 
of work assignments from management.
There have been no important rules modifications 
since the creation of the Adjustment Boards. Such changes 
as have occurred since 1934, and there have been many, have 
been as a result of interpretation of existing legislation 
rather than any notable change in the wording of the legis­
lation itself.
The preceding discussion has briefly indicated the 
origin and legislative development of railroad working rules
Board, Chicago, Illinois, 1946, p. 82, as quoted by: Kauf­
man, op . cit. , p. 30.
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but leaves unexplained exactly what working rules are and 
how they are intended to function. The attempt to delineate 
all rules and wage schedules would be a next to impossible 
task, however, since some agreements covering only one 
classification exceed two hundred pages in length. Such an 
effort would also appear to be of doubtful merit in connec­
tion with this study. Thus, the following is an attempt to
classify and explain only those rules which are the subject
14
of the present controversy.
The Meaning of "Make-Work" Rules
The rules which have most frequently given rise to 
the charge of "featherbedding" may be grouped into the fol­
lowing: (a) the dual basis of payment (hours worked and/or
miles run), (b) payment of arbitraries or constructive
allowances, (c) rates based on graduated scales (weight on 
drivers or number of cars), (d) monthly wage guarantees,
14The complexity of these agreements was noted as 
early as 1918 by one authority who observed: "No one . . .
can fully appreciate the amazing intricacy of these con­
tracts. Every word, often every comma, means something.
Few clauses stand by themselves alone. They interlock with 
and are affected by all sorts of operating practices or 
rules dependent thereon." Ripley, o p . cit.. p. 269.
46
and (e) rules pertaining to crews and work assignments in­
cluding the use of firemen on diesel locomotives. Each 
will be analyzed in terms of the amounts of alleged "excess 
expense" incurred as a result of the rules.
The dual system of payment. While it cannot be 
said that the railroads' method of compensating its employ­
ees is entirely unique it is, nevertheless, a system 
peculiar to and reflecting the specialized nature of rail­
roading. It should be noted, however, that the specialized 
operations which give rise to the peculiar system of wage 
payments is confined to a relatively small proportion of 
the total number of employees. Reference is made to those 
employees said to be engaged in "road service." Yard, cleri­
cal and other groups are reimbursed for their labor on 
essentially the same basis as employees in other industries; 
specifically, at an hourly rate with a standard eight-hour 
day and premium rates for over-time. In the year 1960, for 
example, only slightly more than 100,000 out of a total of 
nearly 800,000 employees were subject to the dual payment
system.
The basis of pay for road service employees has long 
been a perplexing problem to the railroads. Prior to 1900, 
the most common basis of pay was the monthly wage. How­
ever, this method, like the daily wage which superseded it, 
was unsatisfactory because it failed to take into account 
the important differences which existed in the service. No 
two runs or "divisions" were alike in the length of time 
required to traverse them, in the difficulties encountered 
or in the skill required to execute the run efficiently. 
"Trip rates" were then adopted which ostensibly took into 
consideration the special problems encountered on each trip. 
This new system continued to be unsatisfactory and mileage 
plus hours were considered in combination in establishing 
a "standard day" by the turn of the century. This "standard 
day" consisted of one hundred miles or ten hours. In 1910 
the famous Clark-Morrissey Award not only reaffirmed this 
basis of compensation but added the "speed basis" method of 
overtime payment. This concept is somewhat complex in
15Association of American Railroads, Statistics of 
Railroads of Class I in the United States, p . 3. The 
actual count was 101,398 road service employees out of a 
total of 780,494.
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nature and will be discussed later. As already noted, the
Adamson Eight-Hour Act of 1916 provided for a standard day
of eight hours rather than the ten hour standard prior to
that time. With the exception of the awards made by the
Adjustment Boards as previously observed, the pattern of
wage payment for road service employees in existence today
16
was completed for all railroads by the year 1919.
The dual basis of payment as thus established is 
divided into three major categories: (a) miles run, (b)
hours worked, and (c) overtime payments. At the present 
time there are two mileage limitations in effect on American 
railroads. For engineers and firemen (hereinafter referred 
to as "enginemen"), "100 miles or less" constitutes the 
basic daily run on both passenger and freight service. For 
conductors and trainmen (primarily brakemen or flagmen and 
baggagemen) the basic run is "150 miles or less" for pas­
senger service and "100 miles or less" for freight service.
16Harry E. Jones, Railroad Wages and Labor Rela­
tions. 1900-1952, An Historical Survey and Summary of 
Results (New York: Bureau of Information of the Eastern
Railroads, 1953), Chapter II.
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For enginemen, miles in excess of the basic run are paid
for at a pro rata rate; for conductors and trainmen, excess
17
mileage is paid for at a rate stipulated in the contract.
The standard day for enginemen on passenger runs 
is five hours; on freight runs, eight hours. Overtime is 
computed on the basis of twenty miles per hour for passenger 
runs and is paid for at one-eighth the daily rate of one 
hundred miles (see Appendix A for tables of overtime pay­
ments based on both miles and hours). The standard day for 
conductors and trainmen in passenger service is seven and
one-half hours with overtime paid for on the minute basis
18
at a prescribed hourly rate. In freight service the
17An example of the wording here is as follows:
"On runs of 100 miles or less in passenger, freight, snow 
plow, mixed train, work, wreck, pusher or helper, or mine 
run service and trains established for the exclusive pur­
pose of handling milk, 100 miles will be allowed. Miles 
made in excess of 100 paid pro rata." Article 5 (a), Sched­
ule of Wages of Locomotive Engineers, Illinois Central Rail­
road, March 1, 1953, pp. 7-8
1 8For conductors and trainmen, a typical agreement 
on what constitutes a standard day and overtime is as fol­
lows: "Conductors on other passenger runs shall be paid
overtime on a speed basis of 20 miles per hour computed 
continuously from the time required to report for duty until 
released at the end of the run. Overtime shall be computed 
on the basis of actual overtime worked or held for duty,
50
standard day for these classifications is eight hours with 
overtime payment based on a prescribed hourly rate (see 
Appendix A ) .
Thus, the dual basis of payment may be said to con­
sist of one hundred miles or less, five hours or less for 
enginemen in passenger service with overtime commencing 
after five hours in passenger service and after eight hours 
in freight service and paid for at one-eighth of the daily 
rate. For conductors and trainmen, the basis of pay is one 
hundred and fifty miles or less, seven and one-half hours 
or less in passenger service and for freight service, one 
hundred miles or less, eight hours or less with overtime in 
both cases paid for at a prescribed rate.
The following example may be given as an aid in 
clarification. The author accompanied a dispatch freight 
of the Illinois Central System from Chicago to Clinton, 
Illinois, a distance of 114 miles from the Chicago Division’s
except that when the minimum day is paid for the service 
performed, overtime shall not accrue until the expiration 
of seven (7) hours and 30 minutes from the time of first 
reporting for duty . . . "  Article 3 (b) & (c), Schedule 
of Wages and Rules for Conductors. Illinois Central Rail­
road, November 1, 1954, p. 4 .
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Markham Yards. The schedule called for a trip of four hours 
and forty minutes. In spite of a "pick-up" at Kankakee, the 
trip was made in slightly less than the scheduled time. 
Clinton is a division point and the crew disembarked there, 
stayed overnight in Clinton and returned to Chicago the fol­
lowing morning (see Appendix B, Dispatch Freight Schedules
CS-3 and SC-&). Assuming a daily rate for the engineer of 
19
$24,25 his pay for the day amounted to $24.25 mileage
guarantee plus 24.25C per mile for the fourteen additional
20
miles or $3.40 for a total of $27.65. For conductors and
trainmen the pay would be computed in exactly the same
fashion with the only difference to be found in the calcu-
21
lation of the excess mileage payment. For example, a 
conductor on the same trip would have received $21.16 for 
his mileage guarantee and fourteen additional miles at the 
basic rate of 20.21C per mile or an additional $2.S3 for a
■^Rate as of March 1, 1961 (based on weight on 
drivers of 700,000-750,000 pounds).
20Additional pay as a result of "breaking in 
engines for service" or "watching engines" would normally 
be added to this but this will be discussed under the sec­
tion dealing with "arbitraries."
21 Conductors and trainmen are paid excess miles at 
a prescribed rate rather than at pro rata.
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total of $23.99 discounting any arbitraries or constructive 
allowances. Trainmen would be subject to the same method 
of computation and, in this instance, none of the crewmen 
would be eligible for overtime compensation.
If the pay of the traveling engineer who accompanied 
the author on this trip were to be computed, however, it 
would be found to be considerably more complex. This engi­
neer reported for duty at eight A.M., was "held for duty" 
(awaiting departure) for three hours, made the four hour 
trip to Clinton, was "held away from home terminal" for four 
hours and returned, it may be assumed, in the capacity of 
engineer on a passenger train which arrived back at his home 
terminal at ten P.M.; a total elapsed time of fourteen hours. 
Assuming the same pay scale as above, he received $27 .65 
mileage guarantee for the freight run and $21.46 mileage
guarantee on the passenger run plus an additional forty-eight 
22
miles at 2.46C per mile for a total of $31.76 for the pas­
senger run. Because the freight run was made in a total
22Additional mileage is due to the passenger train 
terminating at the downtown Chicago station rather than at 
the Markham Yards.
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elapsed time of seven hours (even including the three 
hours waiting time) no overtime eligibility exists.
As he was called for duty immediately upon arriving in 
Clinton, one might assume overtime is called for on the 
return trip since overtime commences after five hours 
in passenger service and there exists in this case a 
total elapsed time of seven hours. It must be kept in 
mind, however, that overtime only commences after five 
hours if the average speed falls below twenty miles 
per hour. Expressed another way if six hours is re­
quired to travel one hundred miles then, and only then, 
would overtime be paid for one hour. In this case, 
overtime would commence on the 148 mile trip only after 
seven hours and twenty-four minutes. His total com­
pensation for the duty period indicated would thus be 
23
$59.41.
This compensation is calculated only to il­
lustrate the dual basis of payment and does not include 
the "arbitraries'1 that would have been paid in addition. 
These will be calculated under that section.
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In order to illustrate overtime on this run it might 
be assumed that bad trackage held up the freight for a six 
P.M. arrival in Clinton rather than a three P.M. arrival. 
Total elapsed time since the traveling engineer was called 
for duty would be ten hours. Overtime would commence after 
nine hours and seven minutes (see Appendix A) for this 114 
mile run. Overtime is paid for at three-sixteenths of the 
daily rate on the minute basis. On this basis, fifty-three 
minutes of overtime would be equivalent to seventeen ad­
ditional miles (see Appendix A-2) at the pro rata rate or 
an additional $4.12 (24.25d/mile x 17 miles).
It may be seen from the above illustrations that 
payment under the dual basis system may result in quite 
high total wages being paid in a given twenty-four hour 
period. The hourly wage for the fourteen total hours is 
only $4.24 per hour, however, and not generally considered 
to be excessive. Although the carriers attempt to relate 
divisional runs to mileage rules when it is consistent to 
do so, it has been said that there are numerous examples of 
runs which are much less than one hundred miles in length
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24
and which are completed in far less than eight hours.
The length of runs and their relationship to working rules 
will be discussed in detail in a following chapter.
Consist of road crews. Perhaps the area of most 
violent controversy in the general problem of "make-work" 
is that dealing with crews and work assignments (on the 
railroads the make-up of a train crew is referred to as its 
"consist"). This is undoubtedly true because the consist 
question poses a direct threat to employment itself. It 
also is that phase of featherbedding which is most commonly 
referred to by the general public.
Rules dealing with work assignments become "make- 
work rules" when they require employers to maintain employ­
ees on non-existing jobs or require workers to perform 
unnecessary tasks. According to the carriers, any rule 
which "preempts management's right to determine when, if, 
and how many trainmen shall be used on particular trains"
O A
Engineers' 30% Wage Case, 1954, Carriers Exhibit 
No. 38, "Train Studies," as quoted by Morris A. Horowitz, 
"Wage Guarantees of Road Service Employees of American 
Railroads," The American Economic Review, XLV (December, 
1955), 854 .
may be considered "make work rules." In addition, six­
teen states have "full-crew" laws and another seven have
laws which permit the regulation of the size of crews by
26
state regulatory commissions.
The most obvious illustration of the crew consist 
problem is that of the fireman on the diesel locomotive.
Prior to 1930, there was abundant need for firemen on the 
steam locomotive. With the gradual advent of the diesel loco­
motive in the early thirties, however, the fireman was gen­
erally eliminated with the exception of passenger firemen 
on some lines. By 1937, dieselization had become common 
enough (although hardly in the majority) to reach the atten­
tion of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. 
Subsequent national negotiations provided for firemen on 
through passenger trains and on all other service where the 
weight on drivers was over 90,000 pounds which meant virtu­
ally all locomotives. After World War II, an Emergency
2 5Association of American Railroads, Facts About 
Featherbedding in the Railway Industry, p. 22.
^ Jules Backman, "The Size of Crews," Labor Law 
Journal, XII (September, 1961), 805-806.
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Board ruling emphatically denied Brotherhood demands for an 
additional fireman on multiple power unit trains. With 
dieselization nearly complete, the carriers in 1956 attempt­
ed to negotiate the use of firemen at company discretion. 
Other considerations, however, resulted in a three-year mora­
torium on work rule negotiations. In the meantime the most 
significant event in the history of the firemen question 
occurred in Canada as the result of a Royal Commission study 
commonly referred to as the "Kellock Report." The Commis­
sion concluded that there was no reasonable relationship 
between safety in freight and yard service and the presence 
of a fireman on the locomotives. The Commission cited ex­
perience in both Canada and the United States in support of 
their conclusions. A rather ingenious method of protecting 
the firemen's employment rights was devised and some com­
ments will be made in the concluding portion of this study 
relative to the efficacy of the method. On November 1,
1959, the carriers in the United States renewed their de­
mands for complete company discretion in the assignment of 
crews, but shortly thereafter appeared to be content to take 
their case before the Presidential Commission assigned to 
study working rules. In the opinion of one authority, it
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is the one work rule which is most likely to culminate in
. , 27a carrier victory.
Although the fireman issue is the most controversial 
and the area of "make-work rules" on which the carriers have 
centered their greatest attention, it is by no means the 
only issue involved in the crew consist problem. More re­
cently it has become the contention of the railroads that 
technology has made at least one of the brakemen (flagmen) 
obsolete. Frequently the allegation has been made that 
freight and yard trains might well operate under given cir­
cumstances with only an engineer and a conductor whose main
28
duties would be a rear look-out. The Brotherhood of Rail­
road Trainmen, on the other hand, continue to insist that 
there are many hazards to safety which may be overcome only 
by full crews and, in one instance, concluded, "Road or 
yard crews on the nation's railroads still must have not 
less than a conductor or foreman and two trainmen to work
27Morris A. Horowitz, "The Diesel Firemen Issue on 
the Railroads," Industrial and Labor Relations Review. XIII 
(April, 1960), 558.
2 8National Association of Railroad and Utilities 
Commissioners, Report of the Special Committee to Study 
Railroad Problems (Washington: National Association of
Railroad and Utility Commissioners, 1960), pp. 4-5.
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efficiently and safely, and perform all that the railroads'
29
rules and regulations require of them." The excess costs, 
if any, associated with "unnecessary" crewmen will be indi­
cated in the cost study in the following chapter.
Constructive allowance payments or "arbitraries." 
Perhaps the earliest authority on railroad working rules, 
William Z. Ripley, best defined what a constructive allow­
ance or "arbitrary" is when he stated that, "an arbitrary, 
so called, is a payment for services rendered or for hard­
ships endured which in theory are not necessarily a part of
30
the work which crews are assigned." This is, of course, 
the view taken by the workers, while the carriers regard 
the payments as compensation for work which has either al­
ready been paid for or work which is reasonably associated 
with the employee's main task. It seems likely that in the 
minds of some they represent concessions on the part of the 
railroads to secure agreements to contracts.
29 Statement of the Vice-President of the Brother­
hoods of Railroad Trainmen in Trainmen News (Cleveland), 
August 7, 1961.
n
Ripley, o p . cit., p. 340.
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There exists at present on most railroads a great 
variety of these allowances. The Illinois Central Rail­
road, for example, has some seventy-five codes used to 
designate the particular kind of allowances paid for. The 
following will describe some of those more important in 
terms of cost to the railroads.
Payment for various delays are among the more costly 
forms of constructive allowances. In describing this cate­
gory of arbitraries, reference will be made only to the 
engineer agreements as the wording is similar to that in 
other classifications. -In order of their appearance in the 
rules, the most important delays are (a) initial terminal 
delay, (b) final terminal delay, and (c) held away from 
home terminal.
Initial terminal delay is the result of the train
not leaving on schedule. Payment is made for engineers in
freight service "after (1) hour and fifteen (15) minutes'
unpaid terminal time has elapsed from the time of reporting
for duty up to the time the train leaves the terminal, at
31one-eighth (l/8th) of the daily rate . . . "  Thus, in the
31 Schedule of Wages of Locomotive Engineers. Illinois 
Central Railroad, March 1, 1953, Articles 13-14, pp. 15-16.
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example of the Chicago-Clinton, Illinois, trip already re­
ferred to, the engineer had an initial terminal delay of 
two hours (scheduled to depart at 9 A.M., actually departed 
at 11 A.M.). Payment is made on the minute basis and he 
would be entitled to the equivalent of 120 minutes at 5.05$ 
per minute additional to his mileage payment or a total of 
$6.06 for the initial terminal delay. The computation is 
essentially the same for passenger service except that 
"preparatory time" may not be used in computing the allow­
ance. Initial terminal delay is typical of the pay 
guaranteed by many industries if a worker is called for duty 
but the work is not readily available.
Final terminal delay is quite common in freight 
service as payment begins "30 minutes or more from time 
engine arrives at designated main track switch to point of
final release . . . (and) paid for at pro rata rate , . .
32
at 3/16 of the daily rate for all time thereafter." Switch­
ing and spotting may frequently be extensive and a delay of 
two or more hours is not uncommon. In the event of a two
32 Ibid., Article 15, pp. 16-17.
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hour delay, payment for an engineer would be based on one 
and one-half hours at 3/l6ths of the daily rate or the 
equivalent of thirty-three additional miles (see Appendix 
A-2) at the aforementioned rate of 24.250 per mile or a 
total of $8.00 additional to his basic daily or mileage 
guarantee. In the example of the Ghicago-Clinton run used 
throughout, there would be no final terminal delay since St. 
Louis was the final terminal.
The holding of road crews away from their home term­
inal represents a considerable remuneration on the part of 
the railroads. The rules provide that "engineers in pool 
freight and in unassigned service held at other than home 
terminal will be paid continuous time for all time so held 
after the expiration of sixteen hours from the time relieved
from previous duty, at the regular rate per hour paid them
33
for the last service performed . . . "  However, in no case 
will the payment exceed eight hours in any twenty-four hour 
period even if there are several consecutive days involved. 
The time paid for ceases when deadheading (return to home 
terminal as a passenger) or service begins. For example,
3^Ibid., Article 31, pp. 33-34.
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assume that the engineer on the dispatch freight, Chicago- 
Clinton, arrived in Clinton at 3 P.M. one day and was 
ordered the following morning to deadhead the "Green Diamond" 
passenger train back to Chicago, his home terminal, the next 
evening at 7 P.M. He would then be entitled to eight hours 
pay for "held away from home terminal," the length of time 
represented by the difference between the sixteen hours 
which expired at 9 A.M. the following morning and his de­
parture time at 7 P.M. He would not be entitled to more 
than that eight hours, however, because another sixteen hours 
had not elapsed before he was ordered to deadhead. Thus, 
the engineer under consideration would have received $24.25 
for the eight hours held away. In addition, he would re­
ceive pay for passenger train deadheading at the prescribed 
rate of $20.01 per one-hundred miles and a pro rata amount 
for all miles in excess of one hundred miles. It should be 
noted, however, that the crewman must pay for his own meals 
and lodging while away from his home terminal. For most 
employees this represents considerable double domicile ex­
pense .
In addition to delays and deadheading, there are 
numerous other constructive allowances such as that paid
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when a crewman is called for duty and then released because
a train is annulled or set back. In such cases the engineer
"shall be allowed 12^ miles per hour while held on duty with
34
a minimum of thirty-one miles . . ." The engineer in our
example would thus receive $7.52 minimum for being called, 
then released.
Other examples of constructive allowances might in­
clude such items as payment for a crewman "tied up" before 
the expiration of fourteen hours on an uncompleted trip due 
to the federal sixteen-hour law which prohibits train crews 
from working beyond sixteen hours in any given day; payment 
for coupling air hose when carmen are employed and on duty; 
handling of newspapers by baggagemen in excess of a certain 
weight; turning engines on wyes, and many others too num­
erous to mention here.
It should be pointed out that constructive allow­
ances are not necessarily "make-work" payments. The 
Interstate Commerce Commission requires railroads to compile 
these items and report them separately in order to provide 
more detailed statistical data and for no other purpose.
34Ibid. , Article 8, p. 11.
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Rates based on graduated scales. Equity demands 
that recognition be given to the need to adjust pay to the 
arduousness or responsibility associated with a given task. 
Such recognition has long been noted in the railroad in­
dustry. Although the original wage schedules did not include 
classification for size or type of engine, Ripley reports 
that the Wabash Railroad "paid higher wages on the 'six-
wheel coupled engines' than on those with four wheels" as 
35
early as 1886. Although some doubt was voiced as to the 
relationship between the size or weight of an engine and 
the increased difficulty of the engineer's task, there was 
no such doubt regarding the fireman whose task increased in 
an almost direct relationship to the weight and size of the 
engine. Thus, the firemen led the way in the rapidly de­
veloping classification system after the turn of the century.
There was also early controversy concerning the 
proper basis for the classification of locomotives, but 
weight on drivers was "held in the arbitration awards of
35
William Z. Ripley, "Railway Wage Schedules and 
Agreements," Report of the Eight-Hour Commission, U. S.
House of Representatives, 65th Cong., 2nd. Sess. (Washing­
ton: Government Printing Office, 1918), p. 320.
66
1912, 1913, and 1914-15, both for the engineers and firemen
to be the best standard by which to measure physical effort
for the men, as well as productive efficiency for the rail- 
36
roads.” Thus, it may be said that the current practice of 
graduated pay scales for enginemen was well established 
prior to the first World War and has changed only with regard 
to the increases in the size of engines and the rates them­
selves .
At the present time there are twenty weight classi­
fications on the Illinois Central Railroad for both engineers 
and firemen (see Appendix C) ranging from "less than 100,000 
lbs.” to ”950,000 - 1,000,000 lbs." The range of rates in 
engineer passenger service run from $20.26 per one-hundred 
miles to $21.78 for the same distance. The classification 
system is much more significant, however, in freight service 
where the rates range from $21.79 per hundred miles to a
maximum of $25.15 for the highest listed weight classifica- 
37
tion.
3 f>Ibid.. p. 321. Ripley refers to the Eastern 
Engineers' Arbitration, 1912; the Eastern Firemens' Arbi­
tration, 1912-13; and the Western Engineers' Arbitration, 
1914,
37Rates of pay effective March 1, 1961.
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In addition to graduated scales of pay for differ­
ences in size of locomotives, train crewmen have for many 
years opposed what they considered to be an excessive number 
of freight cars on some trains. This heavy tonnage was made 
possible by the use of "double-headers" or the use of two 
engines to pull one train. Early opposition took the form 
of "penalizing it by the exaction of double pay for all con­
ductors and brakemen employed on trains hauled by more than 
3 8
one engine." This attempt on the part of the trainmen 
was generally unsuccessful and after the Eastern Conductors' 
Arbitration Award of 1913 denied them even time and one- 
half for more than one engine the method was abandoned in 
favor of positively prohibiting the practice and thus allay­
ing the criticism that their efforts were associated with
39
an attempt on their part to raise their wages. Eventually 
a system developed which recognized the increased work and 
responsibility associated with longer trains through a grad­
uated pay scale based on the number of cars.
38Ripley, o p . cit.. p. 322.
6 8
At the present time on the Illinois Central these
classifications are for freight service only and the number
of cars range from "less than 81 cars" to "146 to 165 cars"
with the rates for conductors ranging from $20.41 to $21.51
per hundred-miles with "20d added for each additional block
40
of 20 cars or portion thereof."
Monthly wage guarantees. If one is to assume the
economic justice of guaranteeing a minimum daily compensation
once service has begun, the same logic may be carried forward
to include a guarantee of a minimum number of days within a
month or even a year. Under this reasoning, "Readiness to
serve, rather than actual performance, becomes the basis of 
41
pay." Monthly guarantees may be found in the railroad 
industry as early as 1888 when the Southern Pacific Railroad 
provided for such a minimum and became rather common soon 
thereafter in the industry as a whole. Enginemen have 
seldom been given such assurances, possibly because the ad­
ministration of their own working "pools" has traditionally
40Rates of pay effective March 1, 1961. 
“^ Ripley, o p . cit. . pp. 317-18.
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been left to the enginemen themselves. Thus, it is most 
frequently to be found in the conductor and trainmen classi­
fications and most notably in passenger service where sched­
uling is more rigid but also where the opportunity for 
"make-up" service is more limited. A typical rule for 
trainmen states that "regularly assigned passenger trainmen 
who are ready for service the entire month and who do not 
lay off of their own accord, shall receive the monthly
guarantee provided for in Article 1, exclusive of overtime 
42
. . ." The guarantee is computed at the daily rate times
thirty days. If a trainman or conductor lays off voluntarily 
during the month and is replaced by an "extra man" the com­
bined wages of the two are added to determine if any guar­
antee is to be paid. If the wages of the trainman or conductor 
and his "extra man" plus their combined overtime, if any, do 
not produce the daily average when their total is divided by 
thirty, then a guarantee is paid. Overtime is used only in 
computing the average daily minimum guarantee. It will be
42Schedule of Wages and Rules for Trainmen. Yardmen. 
Switchtenders, and Gar Retarder Operators. Illinois Central 
Railroad Company, July 1, 1957, pp. 6-11 (Italics added).
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seen on evaluation of the monthly guarantee in the conclud­
ing chapter that the overtime exclusion is the source of 
greatest concern to rail management in this area.
SUMMARY
Formal working rules are to be found in many indus­
tries at the present time but they find their most unique 
expression in the railroad industry. Undoubtedly, this is 
due to the complex nature of railroading; to the fact that 
road crews do not report to a routine eight-hour-a-day 
assignment at the same locale daily. While hours are a 
measure of effort, distance and other factors become ad­
ditional and justifiable bases for compensation. Perhaps 
an awareness of the highly competitive nature of railroading 
has also led to a feeling of insecurity which could only be 
overcome by a set of rules, minute in detail, but effective 
in restraining the possible arbitrary actions of rail manage­
ment. Some of these rules have been severely criticized as 
having developed into requirements upon the companies of 
payment for work not performed or for unnecessary work.
These include the dual basis of payment or a system of com­
pensation for road service based upon a combination
7 1
hours-mileage computation. The criticism is not directed 
toward the system of computing the pay, however, but rather 
toward what the railroads have long claimed to be outmoded 
mileage bases.
Another set of rules which have been increasingly 
criticized are those dealing with the consist of crews, that 
is the number and kind of crewmen on a given train. Criti­
cism is generally leveled at excess crews or classifications 
which it is alleged technology has made obsolete and un­
necessary. Although the argument is not confined to the 
fireman classification, it is this position which has had 
the greatest reference.
Although less important economically, "arbitraries" 
or constructive allowances, graduated rate scales based upon 
weight of locomotive or number of cars hauled and monthly 
guarantees are criticized as being both costly and unneces­
sarily irritating to smooth and efficient operations.
The following chapter contains a statistical study
of the actual costs incurred by the Illinois Central Railroad
*
for the period 1951-60, when applicable, as a direct result 
of these rules. It will make no attempt to evaluate these
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costs as to whether or not they are excessive as a result 
of "make-work" elements in them. Future chapters will both 
project and evaluate.
CHAPTER IV
THE EFFECT OF WORKING RULES ON RAILROAD REVENUE—
A CASE STUDY OF THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD
From a modest beginning as the first land grant
railroad in the United States in 1851 with lines running 
from Cairo to East Dubuque, Illinois, and from Centralia to 
Chicago, the system has developed to include over six thou­
sand miles of main track, over one thousand miles of sup­
plemental main track and over three thousand miles of yard 
track and siding. Primarily a north-south system, the 
lines now extend north to Albert Lea, Minnesota, and south 
to New Orleans, Louisiana, with important east-west branches 
extending west to Sioux Falls, Sioux City and Council Bluffs, 
and east to Birmingham, Louisville and Indianapolis. The
area served may be traced from the map labeled Figure 2.
Serving a rapidly developing agricultural, mining 
and manufacturing region, the railroad expanded its freight 
carrying activities from slightly over one-half million tons 
in 1860 to nearly seventy million tons in 1960. About one- 
fourth of the present total is represented by products of
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mines, principally coal. From a relative handful of pas­
sengers in 1860, the line today serves nearly three and 
one-half million passengers in through service and some 
twenty million in suburban service annually.
The Illinois Central System typifies the whole rich 
history of the nation's railroading. Often referred to as 
the "Main Line of Mid-America," the line is the tenth largest 
from the standpoint of gross revenue.'1' Because of its 
medium size among Class I railroads of the nation and because 
of its transcontinental character and the services which it 
performs, it has been selected as the most typical of Class 
I Railroads. It is neither predominantly urban, although 
Chicago is its key terminal, nor predominantly rural al­
though it serves the important agricultural area of the mid­
west . In addition the coal mines of Kentucky and southern 
Illinois are important customers for the line.
The problems of the Illinois Central are essentially 
similar to those of railroads in general. If the line's
^Statement of Wayne A. Johnston, President, Illinois 
Central Railroad Company before the Senate Subcommittee 
Hearings on Problems of the Railroads. Part I . 1957, o p . 
cit. , p. 322.
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sense of urgency for a solution is somewhat less than many 
others, it has indicated its concern with the problems of 
make-work rules no less emphatically. The following consti­
tutes an empirical study of the effect of these rules on 
this one railroad. All data has been secured from the Rail­
road's main accounting and personnel offices in Chicago and 
verified by personal inspection of said record.
Financial History of the Line
A review of Table VII indicates quite clearly that 
the Illinois Central Railroad has followed the general pat­
tern already indicated for all Class I railroads in the 
United States. Total operating revenues for 1960, lowest 
for the decade 1951-60, were only $260,225,000, a decrease 
of $26,355,000 over the ten-year average of $286,580,000. 
This represents a percentage decrease of 9.10 per cent which 
is somewhat greater than the decrease (5.86 per cent) for 
all Class I roads combined. The decline in Net Railway 
Operating Revenue of 30,74 per cent was somewhat less, how­
ever, than the corresponding decrease of 37.12 per cent for 
all Class I lines. This probably was due to the greater 
success of the Illinois Central in reducing expenses at a
T A B L E  VII 
O P E R A T I N G  R E V E N U E S *  
1 9 5 1 - 1 9 6 0  
I l l i n o i s  C e n t r a l  R a i l r o a d  C o a p a n y  
( T h o u s a n d  D o l l a r s )
I t e m 1951 1952 1953 1 954 1955 1956 1957 195 8 1959 1 9 6 0
T o t a l  O p e r a t i n g  R e v e n u e $ 2 9 5  0 92 $ 3 0 6 8 56 $ 3 0 8  374 $2 7 5 9 5 9 $29 4 525 $ 2 9 8  4 1 9 $ 2 8 9  756 $ 2 6 4  9 4 0 $ 2 7 1  6 52 $ 2 6 0  2 25
F r e i g h t  R e v e n u e 2 4 3  126 252 2 20 2 5 4  6 80 227 8 64 24 i 9 2 2 2 4 8  8 7 6 241 269 2 1 8  02 4 221 706 2 0 9  46 1
P a s s e n g e r  R e v e n u e 23  2 98 22 9 4 3 23 35b 21 180 22 4 8 0 21 9 8 6 22 3 08 2 1 265 22 347 22 5 8 0
A l l  O t h e r  R e v e n u e
H a l l 6  100 6 389 5 963 5 6 7 8 5 399 5 5 00 5 4 8 5 5 8Si 6 0 7 4 6 9 1 9
E x p r e s s 2 229 3 662 3 562 2 6 2 0 3 753 3 0 09 2 513 2 317 3 165 3 296
A l l  o c h e r 2 0  339 21 6 42 20  813 18 6 17 20 971 19 0 4 8 18 181 17 46 3 18 3 60 17 9 69
T o t a l  O p e r a t i n g  E x p e n s e s 2 2 3  34 6 223 365 221 0 14 209 0 1 0 21 3 3 07 22 2  5 2 8 2 2 6  4 17 2 0 7  0 96 2 1 2  9 89 2 1 1  149
N e t  R a i l w a y  O p e r a t i n g  R e v e n u e $ 71 746 $ 33 4 91 $ 87 3 60 $ 66 9 4 9 $ 81 2 1 8 $ 75 89 1 $ 61  339 $ 57 844 $ 58  6 63 $ 4 9  0 76
L e a s  T a x e s $ 3b  31 0 $ 47 109 $ 47  6 0 4 $ 32 6 22 $ 41 6 3 8 $ 4 0  B 70 $ 31 364 $ 2 8  4 9 8 $ 31 569 $ 2 6  237
R a i l w a y  O p e r a t i n g  I n c o n e $ 3 5  4 3 6 $ 36 382 $ 39 756 $ 34 327 $ 39 5 8 0 $ 35 0 21 $ 29 9 75 $ 29 34 6 $ 27 0 94 $ 22 839
* S o u r c e :  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s  to S t o c k h o l d e r s .
^ I n c l u d e s  o c h e r  p a s s e n g e r ,  s w i t c h i n g ,  J o int f a c i l i t i e s  a n d  m i s c e l l a n e o u s .
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faster rate than could be achieved by the industry in general. 
Taxes tend to decline, of course, with a decrease in revenue 
but the major saving in this area is due to the decline in 
payroll taxes as a result of reduction in employment. The 
employment history will be noted later in the chapter.
The ratio of operating expense to operating revenue 
has increased rather steadily having commenced the decade 
under study at 75.69 per cent, reaching a low point of 72.42 
per cent in 1955 and thereafter increasing each year to a 
new high of 81.14 per cent in 1960. Expenses were calcu­
lated before taxes as taxes theoretically lie outside of 
management discretion.
A more detailed analysis of the revenue position of 
the Company reveals that while freight revenue declined 
over the period under study a total of 11.21 per cent, an 
average of 1.12 per cent as compared with 1.38 per cent for 
Class I railroads generally, passenger revenue actually in­
dicated a slight increase of 0.92 per cent for 1960 over the 
decade. This is in contrast with an annual percentage de­
cline of 3.93 per cent for all Class I roads in total. This 
is largely to be explained by the Illinois Central's
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important suburban Chicago service, a source of revenue not 
available to all lines. It is important to note, however, 
that freight represents 82.32 per cent of total revenue which 
is consistent with the figure of 84.35 per cent for all Class 
I roads combined. Thus, being able to maintain its revenue 
with respect to passenger service is of only small consola­
tion to the Company in face of its seriously declining 
freight revenue. Mail and express have increased slightly 
over the period in question while "all other" has decreased 
somewhat.
An analysis of the sources of declining revenues 
from Table VIII reveals that freight carloadings declined 
11.68 per cent for 1960 over the ten-year average which is 
coincident with the 11.21 per cent decline in freight rev­
enues. Average freight rate increases amounting to 0.31 
per cent per year were undoubtedly offset by excessive 
losses in those areas of the service in which rates were 
not increased in proportion to the loss of tonnage carried. 
There is no reasonable way to analyze losses by territory 
or specific product. Losses by major category may be seen 
upon scrutiny of Table VIII.
T A B L E  VII I
F R E I G H T  C A R L O A D I  N o S  A N D  R E V E N U E  P A S S E N C E R - M 1 L E S  
1 9 5 i  •  ! 9 o O  
L i m o l s  C e n t r a i  R a i l r o a d  C o n p a n y
CA R S  O F  R E V E N U E  F R E I G H T  L O A D E D
G r a i n  a n d  G r a i n  P r o d u c t s 92 299 88 705 98 o5  1 88 189 92 190 92 ) 1 i ) 2 729 95 259 83 343 80 30 8
L i v e  s t o c k do 107 63 212 86 387 61 884 80 317 7 5 60) 65 4 05 60 774 61 983 56 451
C o a  I 52d 4 14 49  7 259 4 8 8 117 4 7 6 629 572 194 5)3 o 3*» 519 651 4 3 4 563 4 2 8 613 395 592
C o k e 7 231 5 69 6 1 i 288 8 500 15 4 8 4 .4 019 16 64 9 . 1 755 15 513 14 537
F o r e s t  P r o d u c t s i -<0 9 9 b 1)1 66 4 202 136 1 79 615 194 67 1 I 9 6 1 )b 176 245 i 60 5 98 172 296 168 292
O r e 20 0 25 25 0 49 29 567 21 934 22 9 0 8 22 0 5 1 29 370 2u 9 70 20 0 6 8 15 4 62
M e r c h a n d i s e ,  L C L a 2 12 06 7 5 74 702 502 746 442 3 40 4 22 0 35 38 6 360 32b 09 1 2 9b 18b 2 54 672 217 165
M l  see 1 l a n e o u s d/d 6 02 4 99 6 7 8 5 46 335 553 4 4 3 621 6 33 63 S 9 26 639 04 5 599 2 9 8 69 7 242 7 12 528
R E V E N U E  P A S S E N G E R - M I L E S * 1 t 1 0 47 563 I 0 25 539 889 997 9 55 368 92 5 3 a 2 884 7 17 8 25 267 83 1 331 847 9 76
P a s s e n g e r s  c a r r i e d c 36 9 78 574 35 0 6 0 865 30  207 967 30 8 35 79) 29 50 7 8 i 3 27 989 493 25 649 671 23 4 4 1 524 23  0 1 2 3 7 8
" C a l c u l a t e d  o n  the b a s i s  ox 3.2 4  tons p e r  car.
^ T h o u s a n d s  ot mile s .
c F l g u r e s  not a v a i l a o i e  on  s a m e  b a s i s  d u e  to c h a n g e s  in a c c o u n t i n g  t e c h n i q u e s .
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Revenue passenger-miles declined 7.30 per cent in
1960 from the ten-year average. A decrease is indicated
for every period except 1955 and 1959. Approximately one-
third of total revenue passenger-miles on the Illinois
Central is suburban as the line operates the second largest
2
commuter service in the nation.
Normally, a decline in revenue passenger-miles results 
in declining revenues; in this case, however, average ..annual 
increases of 0.27 cents per passenger-mile resulted in total 
revenues over the period which were subject to surprisingly 
little fluctuation. This is in contrast with all Class I 
railroads whose lack of commuter service generally, pre­
cluded such annual increases in revenue per passenger-mile. 
Nevertheless, total revenue passenger-miles declined by some 
sixty-seven million in 1960 under the ten-year average. The 
largest share of the loss was suffered in "through" service. 
Commuter service has generally maintained its position in 
spite of increased urban use of the automobile. Operating 
expenses were not reported to the Interstate Commerce Com­
mission or to the stockholders by freight and passenger
2
The Long Island Railroad is first.
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service separately. In a special study made by the Commis­
sion for the year 1959, however, the Company reported a
3
deficit of $15,464,000 for "passenger and allied service." 
Previous reference has been made to the question surround­
ing the method utilized by the Commission for the determi­
nation of passenger service cost (see Chapter II, page 23) 
and will not be reviewed here. The general conclusion is 
that the Company regards the service as being on rather 
unsound footing.
In summarizing the financial position of the Illinois 
Central, it might be worthwhile to consider the rate of 
return on investment which seems to cause the greatest long- 
range concern to the Company. It may be noted from Table 
IX that the rate of return on investment after depreciation 
has declined consistently since 1955 with some fluctuations 
prior to that time. In the years 1956-60, the average 
annual rate of decline has been 11.15 per cent. Expressed 
in another way, the rate of return on investment after de­
preciation declined from 5.92 per cent in 1955 to 3,65 per
3
Transport Economics (Washington: Interstate Com­
merce Commission, May, 1960), p. 3.
T A B L E  I X
RATE OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT AFTER DEPRECIATION 
Illinois Central Railroad Company 
1951-1960
Year
Investment3 
After 
Deprec ia t ion
Rate of Return^ 
on Investment 
After Deprec.
Percent 
Increase or 
(Decrease)
1951 $543 322 6.527. --
1952 550 179 6.61 1.38
1953 558 560 7 .11 7 .56
19 54 564 141 6.09 (14.35)
1955 569 106 6.79 11.49
1956 591 49 3 5 .92 (12.81)
1957 609 891 4.91 (17.06)
1958 612 530 4.78 (2.65)
1959 617 727 4.39 (8.16)
1960 625 158 3.65 (16.86)
aAs of December 31st, each year.
^Based on railway operating income after taxes 
but not excluding interest and other fixed charges.
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cent in 1960. The latter figure is still 1.52 per cent 
higher than the average for all Class I railroads for the 
same period.
Employment History of the Line
The policy of the Illinois Central regarding reduc­
tion of the labor force in road service has been generally 
consistent with that of all Class I roads (see Table VI). 
The most significant phase of the retrenchment has occurred 
in the five-year period 1956-60, presumably because diesel- 
ization became virtually complete during that time.
Employment of road service personnel diminished
overall from 4,188 in 1956 to 2,502 in 1960. This repre­
sents a dwindling in the enginemen and trainmen roles of 
40.26 per cent, 1960 as compared to 1956. Table X illus­
trates this decline by individual classification and in 
total. Only one category, firemen in local freight service, 
showed an increase for the period and this may be explained 
by the fact that firemen were subject to employment reduc­
tion faster than could be attributed to normal attrition. 
Road firemen in through freight service, for example, were 
reduced 60.19 per cent in the five-year period under study.
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Undoubtedly, the excess in the reduction over that of normal 
attrition was simply transferred to the local freight ser­
vice on a seniority basis. This is probably true of other 
classifications as well, but to a lesser extent.
The decline in the road service labor force was not 
the result of changes in working rules which might permit 
reduction in the consist of crews, but rather to cut-backs 
in service, increased speed of trains, longer trains, and to 
the adoption, generally, of new technological efficiencies. 
It is impossible to assign specific causation to the reduc­
tion in specific cases as the Railroad does not compile 
such data for publication. The reduction at this stage has 
doubtlessly come about through retirement, death, disability 
or voluntary termination with replacement through hiring of 
new personnel no longer being made at a rate which would 
maintain the level of employment.
The Effect of "Make-Work" Rules on Revenue
The entire effect of certain working rules on total 
revenue cannot, in all probability, be determined. This is 
true even when a study is made of a single railroad because 
it is impossible to be certain in every case that the cost
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associated with the rule is indeed "excessive" or whether 
it is a cost which is necessarily incurred due to the unique 
nature of the service. It must also be remembered that the 
concept of "make-work" rules is itself a subjective one. 
Nevertheless, reasonable assumptions may be made regarding 
the character of those rules previously described as "make- 
work" rules, and these assumptions form the basis of the 
cost comparisons which follow.
The dual basis of payment. A review of the general
nature and character of the dual basis rules was made in the 
preceding chapter. Some of these characteristics have been 
criticized as resulting in wage payments which do not re­
flect actual work performed or which represent excessive 
payments due to unrealistic or outmoded bases. An evalu­
ation of the validity of these assumptions will be deferred 
to a later chapter. The following table (Table XI) repre­
sents a statistical study of the costs associated with the 
dual basis of compensation for road service employees.
The statistical evidence presented in Table XI assumes
the hour-wage method of compensation. That is, the assump­
tion has been made that railroad road service employees could
TABLE XI
' . . 'KPAR ISOS OF Th cORETICA-  VERSOS Al T L aL  CCJMPESSATlLS 
KOAD SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
l i l s n o l i  C e n t r a l  R a i l r o a d  Co t spany  
1951-1960
Road Service Claaal f lcat I o n
i -*60 0 : f e r e n c e  Due t o  Due  Ba s  1 a S v a t e ®
T h e o r e t l e a  1 
R a t e *
S t .  T I sm? 
H o u r s
X Worke d
T n e o r e t l e a l  
C o o p e n s a  1 1 on
Ac t ua  . 
C o a p e n s a t i o n
Di  f f e  r e n c r  
Due  t o 
Due 1 Be * 1 s
E f f e c t i v e
R a t e . 9 5 ) 1958 1 *57 1956
To :  a 
1 9 5 1 - i 55
T o t a i  
1 9 5 i - 1960
Road Conductors * Passenger^ 5 2 .  5 4 6 , H r . 2 0 -  252 S 5 2 0  0 2 ‘ $ i 139 941 S 6 1 9  915 5 5 . 5 8 1 . H r . 5 61 4  275 S 6 1 8  708 3 5 8 4  635 S 59 3  4 0 7 5 2 584 005 $ 5 61 4  9 45
toad Conductors - Through Freight 2 . 5 1 3 373  926 93 9  67 6 I 58 8  6U5 6 4 8  929 4 . 2 4 8 66 9  06 5 6 2 5  9 4 2 6 5 4  9 2 i 6 3 6  332 3 175 264 6 4 1 0  43 3
Road Conductors - Local Freight 2 . 5 8 5 1 5 0  2 88 90 5  595 i 0 5 6  0 5 3 1 50  951 l . U1 i - }  27 8 141  0 5  3 123  62 6 9 0  127 49 5 781 1 144 4 2 5
Road Baggageneo - Passenger6 2 . 2 5 7 122  4 37 2 76  340 6 2 8  291 351  825 5 .  i  32 3-1 8 - 6 3 60  8 0 0 336  631 3 2 8  140 5 2 1 667 3 241 03 5
Road Brakenen 6 Flagnan - Passenger6 2 . 2 1 6 1 18  54 i 26 5  0 5 8 598  88 3 33 3  737 5 . 0 5 2 333  67 6 339  715 J • 5 S00 2 9 2  224 I 304 481 2 9 19  421
Road Brakeaen 6 Flagnan - Through F r e i g h t 2 . 2 9 6 73 5  8 3 0 I 609  512 2 87 6  2 49 1 18 6  44 2 3 . 90 o i 219  783 1 140  5 54 . i 97  319 1 141 85 b b  0 04 162 11 8 9 0  41 1
Road Brakanen 6 Flagnan - Local F r e i g h t 2 . 3 5 6 9 4 4  84 1 2 22 6  0 4 5 2 6 0 4  9 8 2 37 8  501 2 . 75? 316  417 331  0 95 3 u 3 882 2 0 8  4 ( 6 1 0 14 4 9 0 2 55 3  2 37
Road Ragloaera - Passenger0 4 .  101 224  760 921  741 1 4 7  7 183 55 5  806 6 . 5 7 2 * n88  540 >1 0  5 15 9 i 7 09 0 8 1 4  861 3 6 02 556 7 6 8 9  0 04
Road Ragloaera * Through Freight 2 . 9 3 6 3 8 7  00 8 1 136 255 1 84 2  756 70 6  0 3 0 4 . 762 722  579 6 6 5  4 0 4 tt>7 022 60 7  81 * 2 726 895 6  D96 219
Road Eaglae-trs - Local Freight 2 . 9 9 8 38 5  025 1 154 305 I 30 0  531 1 46  559 3 . 3 7 8 124 154 i 0 8  766 85 691 36 06 7 43 207 5 44  3 33
Road Flranan - Passenger0 J . 5 9 2 148  534 53 3  6 0 6 9 9 0  4 12 4 5 6  937 6 . 6 6 7 643  752 6 5 4  104 612  4 6 0 5 9 4  49 5 2 657 705 3 61 9  322
Road Flranan - Through Freight 2 . 5 0 9 376  819 945  43 9 1 5 4 0  4 6 9 59 5  246 4 . 0 8 8 599  4 6 5 5 5 0  0 2 0 5 52  8 8 0 5 1 8  67 3 24 2 68 0 5 0 5 8  76 8
Road Flranan - Local Freight 2 . 4 7 8 38 6  34 7 957  3 6 8 1 09 7  3 J4 139  9 6 6 2 . 8 4 0 9 1 392 89 4 2 9 60  632 23 5 12 (67 9 15 ) 337  2 16
TOTALS S 12 47 0  9 6 6 $ 1 8  741  709 $ 6  2 7 0  844 $6  708  242 56 53 6  107 So - . 2  689 S5 8 8 5  9 2 8 S27  304 979 5 5 8  118  789
* W e l g h t e d  a v e r a g e  of a l l  p a y  a c a i e a  for y e a r .
^ R a t e  b a a e d  o n  a v e r a g e  of 8 1 - 1 0 3  c a r #  for a l .  i r a t n a c n  a n d  c o n d u c t o r s .
cllt< b a a e d  o n  a v e r a g e  weight o n  d r i v e n  o f  COO,0 0 0  • - 5 u , - . . .  ,3s passenger < - r v : , e ,  and ’ 0 0 . 0 0 0  - 1 5 0 , u u o  Ids ireight service t o r  i n  engineers and firemen. 
^ R e l a t i v e l y  l o w  engineer rate I n  coaparlson co fireaen due tc. 76,206 straight tLae hours In r e d u c e d  apeed s u b u r b a n  service.
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be paid on the basis of hours of work actually performed
instead of the present method of converting miles run to
their time equivalent. All railroads are required to report
to the Interstate Commerce Commission the straight time
4
hours paid for. In determining the compensation for hours 
not actually worked it was necessary to compute the average 
annual wage for each road service classification. This is 
done by the weight-average method utilizing straight time 
hours actually worked for each category for each year as 
the weighting factor. This method was necessitated by the 
fact that the employees in question worked under a multiple 
set of rates during most years involved in the study. The 
formula is:
HW = r^h-^ + r2h2 + • • • • rn^n +
where HW equals the average annual hourly wage and r equals 
the rate, h the straight time hours actually worked and i h  
the annual total straight time hours actually worked. Once 
the average annual hourly rate is determined for each classi­
fication it is then multiplied against the straight time 
hours actually worked for the year to derive the theoretical 
compensation which would be paid assuming this class of
4Monthly Report of Employees. Service and Compen­
sation , ICC Wage Statistics, Form B .
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employees were paid on the customary time basis rather than 
a piece-rate (miles) basis. The difference between the 
straight time compensation actually paid and the derived 
theoretical compensation represents the excess payment which 
might be attributed to the dual basis payment system (see 
Figure 3). It will be recalled that this excess payment 
might result from runs shorter than one hundred or one hun­
dred and fifty miles in which a full day's wage would be
paid, but more significantly it is likely to result from
unrealistic speed bases. For example, an engineer on a 
passenger train which averages fifty miles per hour and who 
is assigned a two-hundred mile run would work four hours 
(assuming away preparation and terminal delays) and receive
two day's pay. At the rate previously used to describe 
5
these rules his effective hourly rate for that particular 
run would be $10.47 per hour in contrast to the computed
average annual contract rate of $4.10 per hour. On the
basis of the above described computations, Table XI reveals 
that the total difference between the theoretical compensa­
tion and the actual compensation amounted to $6,270,844 for
^See page 51 ff., supra .
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FIGURE 3-
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND THEORETICAL COMPENSATION 
DUE TO DUAL BASIS OF PAYMENT SYSTEM 
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD 
1951-1960
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the year, 1960. This sum represents 33.45 per cent of the 
total actual compensation for that year for road service 
employees and is 5.66 per cent above the annual average of 
$5,911,839 for the entire decade under study. A more de­
tailed analysis indicates that enginemen evidence a much 
higher proportion of the excess costs than can be explained 
by the ratio of their employment to the total. This is
particularly true of passenger engineers and firemen. For
6
example, in 1960 engineers received 8.85 per cent of the 
excess while representing only 6.31 per cent of the total 
employees and passenger firemen received 7.43 per cent of 
the total while representing only 4.84 per cent of the total 
employees. This may be explained by the fact that the pas­
senger speed basis is even further removed from reality than 
the freight speed basis and also to the fact that for pas­
senger enginemen one hundred miles constitutes a day's work 
while one hundred and fifty miles composes the basic day for 
the trainmen. The foregoing may be noted from Table XII.
Another, and perhaps more realistic, approach to the 
computation of excess expense attributed to the dual system
^Based on the average number of employees for the
year .
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TABLE XII
RATIO OF EXCESS COMPENSATION TO TOTAL ROAD SERVICE EMPLOYMENT 
BY INDIVIDUAL CLASSIFICATION
Illinois Central Railroad Company
1960
Per cent of Per cent of
Total Excess Total
Road Service Classification Compensation Employment
Roed Conductors - Passenger 9.89 5.39
Roed Conductors • Through Freight 10.35 8.19
Road Conductors - Local Freight 2. A0 6.16
Road BaggageaMn - Passenger 5.61 3.24
Road Brakenwn & Flagmen - Passenger 5.32 3.04
Road Brakeman & Flagmen - Through Freight 18.93 16.35
Road Brakeman & Flagmen - Local Freight 6.04 16.83
Road Engineers - Passenger 8.86 6.32
Road Engineers - Through Freight 11.27 8.43
Road Engineers - Local Freight 2.33 6.79
Road Flreaien - Passenger 7.28 4.36
Road Firemen - Through Freight 9.49 8.19
Road Firemen - Local Freight 2.23 6.71
100.00 100.00
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is to concede the necessity of the piece-rate system but to 
substitute a more accurate set of mileage bases. Although 
exact averages are difficult to obtain the following tabu­
lar calculations are based on the speed ratios below which 
were computed by the Illinois Central Railroad for the year, 
1960.
Type of Service Old New
Passenger, all types 20.0 40.3 mph
Freight, all types 12.5 18.5 mph
The probable explanation for the greater change in 
passenger service vis-a-vis freight service is that freight 
trains have become increasingly heavier in response to the 
increase in driver power. On the other hand, the signifi­
cant decline in passenger business has made longer trains 
unprofitable in that service.
In order to compute the possible excess expense 
directly attributable to outmoded speed bases, the new rate 
was divided into the old rate to obtain a percentage factor 
which could then be applied against actual compensation to
7
reduce the actual compensation based on the new speed bases.
7 rl'The formula might be expressed: 1 - ~  x C a = Ex , 
where r-^  is the old speed, X 2 is the new speed, C a the 
actual compensation and Ex equals the excess expense.
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The difference between the two yields the excess expense re­
sulting from the slower rates. It may be seen from Table 
XIII that the excess compensation theoretically attributable 
to outdated speed bases is somewhat greater than when con­
tract rates were multiplied against straight time hours 
actually worked. For example, for the year 1960 the latter 
method of computation yielded an excess expense 9.74 per 
cent above that of the former method. This is considerably 
less than the 16.37 per cent for the entire ten-year period 
under study. Although there may be numerous other reasons, 
the discrepancy does suggest that perhaps the new speed 
bases are unrealistically high when applied over the decade 
and become accurate with the increase in dieselization with 
each succeeding year. An evaluation of speed bases is re­
served to the concluding chapter.
Consist of road crews. Perhaps the greatest diffi­
culty in assessing excess expense to specific working rules 
is encountered in connection with the consist of road crews, 
With the exception of the fireman on diesel freight loco­
motives there is no real consensus among railroad officials 
as to what constitutes an excessive crew. The problem is
E X C E S S  C O M P E N S A T I O N  A T T R I B U T E D  T O  O U T M O D E D  S P E E D  B A S E S *  
I l l i n o i s  C e n t r a l  R a i l r o a d  
1 9 5 1 - 1 9 6 0
R o a d  S e r v i c e  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
T o t e i
1 9 5 1 - 1 9 6 0
C o n d u c t o r s  - P a s s e n g e r $ 50 8 4 3 0 $ 546 319 5 553 592 S 539 0 63 $ 552 9 84 S 566 54 8 5 563 4 23 S 580 6 07 S 5 60 5( 2 $ 5 74 302 $ 5 545 780
C o n d u c t o r s  - T h r o u g h  P r e l g h t 6 6 0 909 700 4 51 6 6 8 837 5 78 574 597 6 8 0 601 87 1 575 33 6 506 0 52 524 20 3 515 34 3 5 9 29 25 6
C o n d u c t o r s  - L o c a l  F r e i g h t 232 363 282 9 0 4 285 041 287 80 4 295 599 315 233 327 164 331 4 2 7 3 4 0 9 9 1 342 584 3 041 110
B a g g a g e m e n  - P a s s e n g e r 301 757 293 6 55 293 87 2 289 26 4 288 0 87 3 05 754 314 91 4 324 6 37 307 9 4 7 316 533 3 0 36 4 2 0
B r a k e m e n  6  F l a g m e n  - P a s s e n g e r 2 62 473 2*2 0 5 5 254 6 71 257 0 0 0 258 138 271 740 289 128 307 552 301 241 J01 717 2 755 715
B r a k e m e n  &  F l a g m e n  - T h r o u g h  F r e i g h t 1 2 66 4 62 i 269 784 1 2 0 0 0 9 0 1 0 2 7 2 85 i 063 196 1 0 6 3 4 5 4 i 0 2 8 8 56 912 141 946 5 2 0 9 3 3 0 55 10 710 843
B r a k e m e n  6  F l a g m e n  - L o c a l  F r e i g h t 6 1 3 715 6 6 0 2 0 8 6 7 4 6 2 4 6 9 0 394 717 4 5 7 754 599 8 0 0 566 803 0 6 0 837 731 84 5 0 5 6 7 39 7 4 1 0
E n g i n e e r s  - P a s s e n g e r 6 3 0 697 6 73 441 6 6 8 307 6 6 6 9 9 3 674 09 0 704 181 7 30 4 5 6 7 58 570 726 6 0 3 744 205 6 977 543
E n g i n e e r s  - T h r o u g h  F r e i g h t 776 6 1 8 8 18 546 774 0 0 3 6 8 2 273 701 3 58 6 8 5 345 6 65 621 5 8 8 02. 609 9 7 5 597 790 6 899 5 50
E n g i n e e r s  - L o c a l  F r e i g h t 2 85 353 356 177 3 57 0 4 5 362 001 3 68 394 389 178 4 1 3 720 396 697 4 1 9 843 42 I 899 3 770 307
F i r e m e n  - P a s s e n g e r 399 9 2? 4 3 8 7 i 5 4 3 7 133 4 3 2 8 6 8 4 3 4 6 53 4 5 8 779 4 6 9 23 7 4 9 7 2 0 0 4 8 7 5 8 9 4 9 8 9 70 4 5 55 073
F i r e m e n  - T h r o u g h  F r e i g h t 6 4 3 267 6 84 53 5 6 5 0 2 3 8 5 56 549 5 66 759 5 59 787 537 255 4 8 4 596 5 06 8 8 6 5 0 0 0 53 5 689 9 25
F i r e m e n  - L o c a l  F r e i g h t 237 0 69 298 729 301 110 3 07 683 313 09 5 327 6 7 4 3 44 8 80 341 195 3 53 5 12 355 9 7 5 3 180 9 22
T O T A L S $6 819 042 $7 275 519 $7 118 56 3 $6 6 77 751 56 831 4 9 0 $7 0 0 4 143 5 7 0 6 0 556 56 831 755 56 9 2 3 5 53 56 9 47 4 8 2 $69 4 8 9 854
‘ C o m p u t a t i o n s  b a a e d  o n  n e w  s p e e d  r a t i o s  of 4 0 . 3  m p h  for p a s s e n g e r  t r a i n s  a n d  18. 5  m p h  for f r e i g h t  t r a i n s  In c o n t r a s t  w i t h  2 0 . 0  m p h  p a s s e n g e r  a n d  12.5 m p h  f r e i g h t  o n  c u r r e n t  b a ses.
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further complicated by the presence of so-called "full-crew" 
laws in sixteen states and commission authority to regulate 
the size of railroad crews in seven other states. The Illi­
nois Central Railroad is subject to law or regulation in 
this respect in Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana (Commission 
regulation only), Mississippi and Nebraska; and is free from 
such restraint in Alabama, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Minne­
sota and Wisconsin.
Enough variance exists in operating conditions to 
make it difficult to establish any definite number of crew­
men for all trains operating under all conditions. It is 
generally conceded by the Companies that the term "excess 
crews" in road service refers to the fireman on the freight 
locomotive plus one brakeman— typically the "head-end" brake­
men— on all service. This would reduce the passenger minima 
to an engineer, a fireman, a conductor and one brakeman (and 
in most cases a baggageman), and in freight service to a 
three-man crew consisting of the engineer, a brakeman and 
a conductor. At the present time there are usually two 
brakemen to each train and three in the case of "full-crew 
states" service. Table XIV shows the savings which would 
have accrued to the Company assuming the abandonment of the
TABLE XIV
SAVINGS IN COMPENSATION PAID ATTRIBUTED 
TO SELECTED REDUCTION IN CONSIST 
OF ROAD CREWS
Illinois Central Railroad
1956-1960
Year
Number of 
Firemen® 
Reduced
Compensation 
of Firemen 
Reduced
Number of 
Trainmen*3 
Reduced
Compensation 
of Tralnmenc 
Reduced
1956 662 $ 2 735 699 758 $ 3 071 868
1957 647 2 719 280 714 3 106 648
1958 49 3 2 545 567 574 2 948 882
1959 488 2 652 276 510 3 094 047
i960 373 2 637 803 453 3 040 057
Total, 5-years 2 663 $13 290 625 3 009 $15 261 502
Average, 5-year 533 $ 2 658 125 602 $ 3 052 300
®Includes all freight firemen,, no passenger firemen.
Arbitrarily 
flagmen. This would
includes exactly 
be somewhat high
one
in
-half of all brakemen 
full-crew states.
and
cAverage of all brakemen and flagmen since it represents one- 
halt ot actual compensation paid.
fireman position on all freight trains and the reduction of 
half of the trainmen on all trains (in "full-crew states" 
there would still be two brakemen under this assumption). 
Five-year averages indicate a saving of a little over two 
and one-half million dollars from the abandonment of the fire­
man position on road freight service and slightly over three 
million dollars per year if the brakemen consist were reduced 
by one-half. Thus, a saving would accrue to the Illinois 
Central of approximately five and one-half million dollars 
annually by reducing the train crews as indicated. This 
represents 30.19 per cent— nearly one-third— of total aver­
age compensation for road service employees on the line. 
Further reductions may well be called for by the Companies 
in the near future but these seem to be reasonable minima.
An analysis of the validity of such reductions is deferred 
to a later chapter, however.
Constructive allowances or "arbitraries .1 Construc­
tive allowances are payments which the Railroads contend are 
for work already paid for or for unnecessary work. The 
labor organizations, however, regard them as payments for 
work which is not a regular part of an employee's assignment
1 0 0
or for work which entails unusually difficult, dangerous or 
arduous duty. The various classes of assignments for which 
"arbitraries" are paid are too numerous to be categorized 
into cost accounts for the present purpose. The Illinois 
Central Railroad provides some 99 codes for present or ex­
pected allowances. Seven major accounts are maintained and 
reported to the Interstate Commerce Commission. These ac­
counts are summarized in Table XV for the decade, 1951-1960. 
It will be noted that "deadheading" accounts for nearly 
fifty per cent of the total each year. Strictly speaking, 
deadheading may not be considered an "arbitrary." That is 
to say, it might well be removed before considering the 
constructive allowances which are to be considered "make- 
work" rules and which result in excess payments to the 
employees. This will be discussed at more length in the 
final evaluation. The total charged to these seven major 
accounts has normally amounted to between $600,000 and 
$700,000 annually or to roughly three per cent of total 
compensation. All remaining arbitraries would not be sig­
nificant to one per cent.
TABLE XV 
CONSTRUCTIVE ALLOWANCES 
Illinois Central Railroad Company 
1951-1960 
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Selected Accounts 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 Total Average
Deadheading $333 $333 $328 $345 $366 $376 $361 $306 $302 $306 $3 358 $336
Called and Released 5 5 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 25 3
Run Around 5 5 5 6 6 7 4 3 4 4 49 5
Initial Terminal Delay 28 35 36 34 58 53 57 57 23 30 413 41
Final Terminal Delay 185 191 194 175 189 183 176 164 166 168 1 790 179
Laid Up A/C 16-hour Law 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 1
Held Away From Home Terminal 146 117 118 120 123 135 132 ill 101 123 1 226 123
Totals* $702 $684 $684 $683 $745 $758 $/32 $644 $599 $634 $6 867 $687
♦Individual numbers will not necessarily sum to totals due to rounding to thousands of dollars.
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Graduated rate scales. Road crews are not paid on 
the basis of a single rate for a given type of service but 
rather upon a scale of rates classified according to weight 
on drivers or mallets for enginemen and to the number of 
cars hauled in the case of trainmen. It has generally been 
the contention of rail management that such classifications 
are no longer realistic under modern technological conditions. 
Thus, they allege that the lowest negotiated rate should be 
the rate applicable to road service employees. On this 
basis, Table XVI reveals the differential which existed in 
the year 1960 when the minimum contract rate was averaged 
for the year and then multiplied against the straight time 
hours actually worked in order to compare these totals with 
the actual compensation paid the employees. The difference 
represents 3.95 per cent of the total actual compensation 
for the year. A discussion of whether or not it is realistic 
to assume that the minimum rates would be negotiated is de­
ferred to the concluding chapter. At this point it is suf­
ficient to suggest that the average existing weights on 
drivers or number of cars hauled would more likely be the 
result of collective bargaining on this issue.
TABLE XVI
COMPENSATION OP KOAD EMPLOYEES BASED ON MINIMUM RATES 
Illinois Central Railroad Company 
Year 1960
Road Service Classification
Average®
Minimum
Rates
Straight Time 
Hours 
Paid For
Compensa t ion 
Based on 
Minimum Rates
Ac tua1 
Compensa t ion
Difference 
Due to 
Graduated 
Sea le
Road Conductors - Passenger $2,713 404 603 $ 1 09 7 688 $ 1 139 941 $ 42 253
Road Conductors - Through Freight 2 .446 626 684 1 532 869 1 588 605 55 736
Road Conductors - Local Freight 2.316 411 998 1 036 587 1 056 053 19 466
Road Baggagemen - Passenger 2.394 256 714 614 573 628 29 1 13 718
Road Brakemen U Flagmen - Passenger 2.385 249 901 596 014 598 883 2 869
Road Brakemen & Flagmen - Through Freight 2.229 1 236 815 2 756 861 2 876 249 119 388
Road Brakemer. 6 Flagmen - Local Freight 2.288 1 114 431 2 549 818 2 604 982 55 164
Road Engineers - Passenger^ 3.920 413 170 1 619 626 1 477 183 ( 142 443)
Road Engineers - Through Freight 2.631 623 723 1 641 015 1 842 756 201 741
Road Engineers - Local Freight 2.701 447 359 1 208 311 1 300 551 92 240
Road Firemen - Passenger 3.434 273 409 938 886 990 412 51 526
Road Firemen - Through Freight 2.240 615 227 1 378 108 1 541 469 163 361
Road Firemen - Local Freight 2.290 450 366 1 031 338 1 09 7 334 65 996
Tota1s
CO
<J> 001 694 $18 742 709 $741 015
aThis represents a weighted average of three different wage rates during the year.
bThis negative figure probably due to the large number of passenger engineers in suburban service.
J
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Monthly wage guarantees. The Illinois Central Rail­
road reports that it simply does not permit a situation to 
develop under normal circumstances which would require the 
payment of monthly guarantees. It is not always possible, 
however, to prevent completely a guarantee situation from 
occurring. The Company reported that the sum is not likely 
to exceed one thousand dollars per month, and in summarizing 
the total costs associated with "make-work" rules, the 
figure of $12,000 per year will be used.
Summary of Financial Effects of "Make-Work" Rules
Enough evidence has been gathered at this point to 
make possible a summary of the additional expense attributed 
to those working rules which have been described as "make- 
work" rules. It should be recalled that the following 
totals in no way purport to encompass all additional expense 
associated with all working rules. It is in road service, 
however, where the major difficulty has arisen and it is in 
road service where the "make-work" characteristics of the 
rules may be most clearly delineated.
In summarizing the foregoing sub-totals (Tables XI- 
XVI) care has been taken to avoid double counting. The
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excess expense attributed to the dual basis of pay, for 
example, consists of the average between the hours and the 
speed bases. In addition, those expenses associated with 
the theoretical reduction in the consist of crews has been 
subtracted from the dual basis totals since, clearly, if the 
firemen and brakemen are deleted from the roles they cannot 
be subject to excessive compensation at the same time. Simi­
larly, the additional compensation due to graduated rate 
scales and constructive allowances have been reduced in the 
same manner. Since the primary purpose of the study is to 
establish the total net annual costs of the rules in question 
only the most recent year available (1960) has been sum­
marized. The essential purpose of the multi-year study has 
been to establish the statistical validity of the most recent 
year. A close study of the data presented indicates that 
the year 1960 is a representative year within ordinary con­
fidence limits. As projections are not contemplated over 
time it would seem that ten-year averages would be less 
meaningful than the most recent year. This is occasioned 
by the fact that the study envisions an industry in which 
employment has declined and is expected to continue to de­
cline for some time in the future.
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An analysis of Table XVII indicates the total ex­
pense associated with the specific rules discussed amounts 
to approximately eleven and one-half million dollars per 
year. This represents somewhat over half of the total com­
pensation of road service employees and slightly over five 
per cent of total operating expenses. Elimination of these 
expenses would result in about one-fifth additional net 
railway operating revenue before taxes, Some taxes would 
be adversely affected, however, resulting in a counter in­
fluence on total operating revenues. This is particularly 
true of federal corporate income taxes which have an inverse 
relationship to expenses.
The major source of the expenses related to "make- 
work" rules is to be found in the consist of road crews.
If the trainmen consist were left undisturbed the total would 
be reduced by some three million dollars per year. This 
should be noted, inasmuch as the railroads have concentrated 
their crew reduction attentions on the freight fireman with 
only passing reference to the train crews. It seems logical 
to conclude, however, that any success achieved in removing 
freight firemen will almost certainly lead to requests 
concerning train crew reduction as well. Thus, it appears
TABLE XVII
SUMMARY OF EXPENSE ATTRIBUTED TO "MAKE-WORK” RULES 
Illinois Central Railroad Company 
Year 1960
Annual Expense
Class of Working Rule Attributed to Rules
Dual Basis of Payment®
0000</> 919
Consist of Crews*5 5 677 860
Constructive Allowances6 538 816
Graduated Rate Scales1* 629 566
Monthly Guarantees6 12 000
TOTALS $11 677 161
Per Cent of Total Road Service Compensation^ 52., 16
Per Cent of Total Operating Expenses 5,.53
Addition to Net Railway Operating Revenue(before 
If Above Expense Eliminated - Per Cent
i taxes) 
21,.71
aAverage of hours and speed basis after 
sist of crews.
reduction in con-
^Compensation of all firemen in freight 
half brakemen In all service.
service and one-
£
Reduced in the ratio of eliminated firemen and brakemen.
^Reduced in the ratio of eliminated firemen and brakemen. 
eEs tima te.
^Includes Straight Time Compensation, Constructive 
Allowances, and Overtime.
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appropriate to consider this question in any overall 
analysis for the future. The following chapter will at­
tempt to project the conclusions arrived at in the case 
study of the Illinois Central Railroad to all Class I line 
haul railroads in the United States.
CHAPTER V
FINDINGS AND EVALUATIONS
This study has briefly outlined the general nature 
of railroad problems and has surveyed specifically and in 
some detail the character and financial effects of "make- 
work" rules. Before proceeding to project the findings of 
the case study and to analyze their effects on railroads 
generally, a review of the stated objectives of the study 
may well be in order. It has been the primary purpose of 
this study to determine the actual financial costs of cer­
tain working rules and the effect of these costs on rail­
road revenue. Only those rules which can be clearly defined 
as possessing certain "make-work" characteristics have been 
selected for analysis. The entire study has been confined 
to rules governing road service employees since it is this 
group which labors under circumstances unique to the rail­
road industry. A second and equally important purpose of 
the study is to analyze the findings with a view to determ­
ining if the rules produce an unreasonable burden on
109
1 1 0
railroad financial health and if so whether elimination or 
modification of the rules will result in financial remedy. 
The major methodology has been a case study of a representa­
tive Class I railroad and has involved both statistical and 
interviewing techniques. This chapter will project the 
findings of the study and attempt to evaluate them in a 
manner suggestive of possible solutions to the problem.
Findings
The foregoing case study has suggested the magnitude 
of the financial effects of certain working rules on the 
revenue of a single Class I railroad— the Illinois Central 
Railroad. There are clear advantages to a limited study 
of this type. For example, the data is less voluminous and 
is subject to more careful control and may be more easily 
verified as to accuracy. The findings are even more valu­
able, however, if they are capable of being projected with 
reasonable validity to all Class I railroads.
At the present time there are about one hundred and 
ten such railroads in the United States; and they "cover 
the operations of approximately 96 per cent of the total 
railroad mileage of the United States, and earn about 96
per cent of the total revenue." In the year 1960, the 
Illinois Central Railroad earned 2.735 per cent of the total 
revenues for all Class I roads. Thus the projection sample 
is a relatively small one. The size of the sample is not 
as significant, however, as the degree of confidence which 
can be attributed to its use as a projection device. The 
problem in this case is to determine, insofar as it is pos­
sible to do so, if the railroad under study is sufficiently 
representative to permit valid projections. In gathering 
evidence of its representative status five key areas of 
agreement were investigated. Those judged to be highly 
significant are (1) total operating revenue, (2) total op­
erating expense, (3) total compensation of road service 
employees, (4) the average number of road service employees, 
and (5) freight revenues. The percentage which the Illinois 
Central Railroad represents of the total reflects the degree 
of consistency (or lack of it) when comparing the Railroad 
with that of all Class I roads in these important areas.
Th e  f o l l o w i n g  is an a n a l y s i s  of the r e a s o n s  for s e l e c t i n g  
t h e s e  p a r t i c u l a r  categories.
^Association of American Railroads, Statistics of 
Railroads of Class I in the United States. Years 1950 to 
1960 (Washington: Association of American Railroads, 1961),
Title page .
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Total operating revenue. Total revenue is perhaps 
the most accurate measure of the volume of business at­
tributed to a specific railroad and significant projections 
could possibly be made on this basis alone.
Total operating expense. Since this study is con­
cerned with rail operating expenses it is necessary to 
ascertain that the operating expenses of the sample rail­
road bears the same close relationship to total Class I 
operating expenses as the individual revenue bears to the 
total revenue. If it should not, the conclusion may well 
be drawn that there is a significant difference in the 
nature of the operation.
Total compensation of road service employees. A 
more refined test of expense is that which compares the 
total compensation of road service employees of the Illi­
nois Central Railroad with that of all Class I roads since 
the study is primarily involved with the alleged excess 
expense associated with the compensation of this particular 
group of employees. Failure to coincide closely in this 
category would render other comparisons invalid for the
113
purposes of this study.
Average number of road service employees. Compen­
sation of road service employees might be representative 
on the Illinois Central when compared to the same cost 
category on all Class I lines but the degree of "feather­
bedding" could be quite different if there were any impor­
tant difference in the number of employees whose compensation 
make up the excess expense. There are notable limitations 
to the comparison, principally the fact that the excess 
expense associated with the rules make up only a part of the 
total compensation.
Freight revenue. A further refinement is necessary 
to make certain that no significant distortions arise be­
cause of any possible disproportion between freight and 
passenger■service. Because of the differences in the basis 
of pay as between the two services, an excess of one or the 
other could render results which might be misleading. This 
is particularly true of the Illinois Central because of the 
unusually large amount of suburban passenger service of­
fered by the Company.
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The following represents the proportionate share of
the Illinois Central with respect to total Class I railroads
for each category:
Total operating revenue .................... 2.735%
Total operating expense ....................2.364
Total compensation of road serv. employ...2.549 
Average number of road serv. employees ....2.467 
Freight revenues ............................2.609
While it is true that no perfect correlation exists 
between these percentages and the actual excess expense at­
tributed to "make-work" rules for all Class I roads, it may 
be reasonably assumed that a correlation does in fact exist 
somewhere between the outer limits of 2.735 per cent as the 
upper and 2.364 per cent as the lower range. That„is to 
say, when the reciprocal of these percentages are multi­
plied against the total "excess expense" for the Illinois 
Central the resulting dollar totals represent the range 
within which total excess compensation for all Class I lines 
is likely to fall.
The following represents the dollar values of the 
"excess expense" for all Class I roads when the recipro­
cal of the above percentages is multiplied against the total 
of the excess expenses for the year 1960 for the Illinois 
Central Railroad ($11,677,161). Table XVIII demonstrates
TABLE XVIII
PROJECTION OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS TO ALL CLASS I RAILROADS 
Year 1960 
(Thousands of Dollars)
Areas of Comparison
All Class I 
Railroads
Illinois Central 
Railroad
Percent 
Illinois Central 
of All Class I
Projection*
Factor
Excess Expense 
Attributed to 
Work Rules for 
All Class I RR
Total Operating Revenue $9 514 294 $260 225 2.735 36.563 $426 952 038
Total Operating Expense 8 930 278 211 149 2.364 42.301 493 955 587
Total Compensation of Road Employees 878 188 22 386 2.549 39.231 458 106 703
Freight Revenue 8 025 423 209 461 2.60% 38.329 447 573 904
Average Number of Road Employees 101 398 ampl. 2 502 enpl. 2.468 40 519 473 146 886
Average Excess Compensation 459 947 003
Per Cent of Total Operating Expenses 5.15 5.53
Per Cent Increase In Net Railway Operating
Income After 81 lalnatlon of Excess Expense 44.06
*Thla factor is the reciprocal of the percentage figure In the preceding colleen and la multiplied In each caae agalnat the exceaa 
compensation computed for the Illinois Central, $11,677,161.
11
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these computations in more detail.
Total operating revenue ............. $426 952 038
Total operating expense .............  493 955 587
Total compensation of road employ .. 458 106 703 
Average number of road employees .. 47 3 146 886
Freight revenue ......................  447 57 3 904
Using the above five bases of comparison it would
appear that the "excess expense" attributed to "make-work"
rules for all Class I railroads would lie somewhere between
427 million dollars and 494 million dollars. The statisti-
2
cal mean is very close to 460 million dollars but it 
should be emphasized that this is only a measure of central 
tendency. Neither this figure nor any of the figures repre­
senting individual areas of comparison should be regarded 
as final, precise statements of the "excess" compensation 
attributed to certain working rules. To establish statis­
tical validity would require considerably more than one 
railroad and one year. Such an investigation would add 
little in the way of further illumination for the purposes 
of this study. The projection provides only a very general 
idea of how the costs would appear when translated from the
2$459,947,003
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Illinois Central to the entire industry. This is sufficient, 
however, to provide a reasonably confident substantiation of 
the railroads' claim that the rules are costing them about 
$500 million annually. Although the validity of the 
"featherbedding" charges are still to be analyzed, it appears 
that the unrealistic character of some working rules have 
created an additional burden of expense to American rail­
roads amounting to some half-billion dollars per year. This 
amounts to slightly over five (5.15) per cent of total op­
erating expenses, but when eliminated it results in an in-
3
crease of 44.06 per cent in net railway operating income.
Consequently the rate of return on net investment after
depreciation would increase for the year 1960 from 2.13 per
cent to 3.81 per cent, a level of return which was last at-
4
tained in 1956 .
It should be re-emphasized that all of these compu­
tations reflecting the effect of the excess compensation of
3A11 computations are based on the mean of 
$459,947,003 .
4Net railway operating income is computed after 
taxes but before fixed charges such as "interest on funded 
and unfunded debt."
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railroad revenue are based on the statistical mean with its 
associated qualifications. Nevertheless the figures reflect 
the general effect such compensation had on railroad revenue 
in 1960. Rather broad implications may be deduced from 
these results but it should be clear that removal of the 
expense is only a very partial answer to the railroads' 
financial problems. A return on net investment in the vi­
cinity of three and three-quarters per cent is not likely 
to be construed as a healthy financial condition. More 
important, perhaps, are the questions which surround the 
basic assumptions of "make-work" and which underlie the entire 
analysis. These assumptions are by no means universally ac­
cepted and if they possess a dubious quality then the value 
of the calculations as a means of suggesting possible modi­
fications in working rules would be seriously impaired.
The following is thus an effort to explore the validity of 
these assumptions.
Evaluations
There is considerable divergence of opinion as to 
how and when a legitimate working rule becomes a "make-work" 
rule. This is apparent from even a cursory examination of
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the statements made by the rail managements and the labor
organizations in their published literature. Evidence of
the contrasting views is equally pronounced in the Report
of the Presidential Railroad Commission released early in 
5
1962. The following evaluations will utilize this Report 
as well as the author's interviews and observations. Each 
of the major work rules previously defined as having "make- 
work" characteristics will be analyzed in turn.
The dual basis of pay system. The most vexing 
problem to be faced when analyzing working rules is con­
cerned with methods of compensation. The heart of the 
compensation structure is the dual basis system of payment 
for road service employees— that is, a system which requires 
consideration of both miles run and hours of service. It 
is a system in which the miles operated over the daily mini­
mum are paid for on a pro-rata basis while overtime is paid 
for on a "speed basis." One aspect of this dual system 
which makes problems associated with it so vexatious is its 
great complexity. Considerable confusion may result when
5
Report of the Presidential Railroad Commission. A 
report prepared by the Commission established by Executive 
Order No. 10891, November 1, 1960 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, February 1962) .
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an attempt is m a d e  to r e l a t e  the m i l e a g e  b a s i s  o f  p a y  to 
the s peed b a s i s  for overtime.
A  s i m p l i f i e d  e x a m p l e  m a y  h e l p  to i l l u s t r a t e  the d i f ­
ficulty. A s s u m e  an e n g i n e e r  is e m p l o y e d  in t h r o u g h  freight 
s e r v i c e  w h i c h  has a b a s i c  d a y  of eight h o u r s  and a m i l e a g e  
s t a n d a r d  of one h u n d r e d  miles. T h e  e n g i n e e r  is g u a r a n t e e d  
a full day's p a y  for any m i l e a g e  h e  runs up to the b a s i c
- -t
m i n i m u m .  Thus, if h e  runs s i x t y  m i l e s  in one h o u r  o r  in 
e ight h o u r s  he w o u l d  r e c e i v e  the b a s i c  d ay's pay. In the 
e vent h e  runs m o r e  t h a n  one h u n d r e d  miles, e.g., 125 m i l e s  
w i t h i n  eight hours, he r e c eives the b a s i c  day's p a y  p l u s  an 
a d d i t i o n a l  o n e - f o u r t h  of this p a y  as the p r o - r a t a  m i l e a g e  
allowance. If he c o m p l e t e s  the 125 m i l e  run in ten h o u r s  
it w o u l d  at first app e a r  that he is e n t i t l e d  to o v e rtime. 
O v e rtime, however, is c o m p u t e d  on a "speed basis." S p e e d  
b a s e s  are c a l c u l a t e d  b y  d i v i d i n g  the b a s i c  m i l e s  b y  the 
b a s i c  hours, in this case b y  d i v i d i n g  one h u n d r e d  m i l e s  b y  
eight hours. Thi s  results in a s p e e d  b a s i s  of t w e l v e  and 
o n e - h a l f  m i l e s  p e r  hour. U n d e r  t hese c o n d i t i o n s  the e n g i n e e r  
w o u l d  r e c e i v e  no o v e r t i m e  for c o m p l e t i n g  a run of 125 miles 
in ten hours; h e  h a s  e x a c t l y  p e r f o r m e d  a c c o r d i n g  to the 
s p e e d  basis. O n  the o t h e r  hand, if h e  c o m p l e t e d  the same
1 2 1
run in eleven hours his speed would have fallen below the 
average of twelve and one-half miles per hour and he would 
be entitled to one hour overtime, in this case at 3/l6ths 
of the daily rate, or, expressed in another way, at time 
and one-half.
The above example is adequate to illustrate the com­
plexity of the wage structure but it should be kept in mind 
that the difficulty is magnified when different classes of 
service are considered. Unfortunately, the incomparable ob­
tuseness of the structure tends to obscure the inequities 
which exist within it. These inequities take many forms; 
for example: one engineer travels twenty-five miles in an
hour and receives a day's pay. Another travels one hundred 
miles in eight hours and receives the same day's pay; while 
still another completes his hundred miles in two hours and 
is similarly compensated. Or, as regards overtime, one 
engineer completes a 125 mile run in ten hours and receives 
only the pro rata mileage share for the extra twenty-five 
miles while another engineer fails to meet his schedule, 
possibly through his own fault, and completes his run in 
eleven hours and receives not only the pro rata mileage 
allowance but an additional hour's pay and at premium rates
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in the b a r g a i n .  T h e s e  are bu t  two e x a m p l e s  of a n u m b e r  of
s uch d i s p a r i t i e s .  The P r e s i d e n t i a l  C o m m i s s i o n  r e p o r t  has
s u m m e d  up the p r o b l e m  in the f o l l o w i n g  m a n n e r :
The c o n c l u s i o n  is that the p r e s e n t  d i s p a r i t y  in 
h o u r s  o n  d u t y — some u n d u l y  short and o t h e r s  e x ­
c e s s i v e l y  l o n g — is u n c o n s c i o n a b l e ;  the s p e e d  b a s i s  
of o v e r t i m e  is an a n a c h r o n i s m  i n v o l v i n g  i n c o n ­
s i s t e n c i e s  among types of runs; the d ual b a s i s  of 
p a y  c o n t a i n s  w i d e s p r e a d  a n o m a l i e s  and i n e q u i t i e s  . . .
the p a y  rules are complex, and w i t h  m a n y  c o m p o n e n t s  
to c o m p e n s a t i o n ,  t h e y  c o n t r i b u t e  to d i s p u t e s .  In 
short, the w o r d  w h i c h  b e s t  d e s c r i b e s  the c o m p e n s a t i o n  
s t r u c t u r e  is a m e s s . ^
Th e  w o r s t  aspect of this is that it g r e a t l y  c o m p l i ­
cates any atte m p t  to a n a l y z e  the c o m p e n s a t i o n  s y s t e m  w i t h  
a v i e w  to i m p r o v e m e n t .
T h e r e  are two s e p a r a t e  and v e r y  b r o a d  a p p r o a c h e s  to 
the p r o b l e m .  First, it is p o s s i b l e  to s u b s t i t u t e  an h o u r l y  
w a g e  s t r u c t u r e  for the dual h o u r s - m i l e s  m e t h o d  n o w  employed. 
S econdly, the p r e s e n t  s y s t e m  m a y  s i m p l y  b e  m o d i f i e d  to p r o ­
v id e  m o r e  r e a l i s t i c  b a s e s  for p a y m e n t .  T h e  first s o l u t i o n  
is the e a s i e s t  one but also the least l o g i c a l . R o a d  t rain 
crews do no t  o p e r a t e  in an e n v i r o n m e n t  w h i c h  is c o n d u c i v e  
to the h o u r l y  w a g e  method. T h e r e  are m a r k e d  d i f f e r e n c e s  in 
the k i n d s  and leng t h s  of s e r v i c e  and in the d e g r e e  of d i f ­
f i c u l t y  e n c o u n t e r e d  on v a r i o u s  runs. Th e  p r e s e n t  p i e c e - r a t e
^Ibid., p . 241 .
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system recognizes these differences and from the standpoint 
of equity the system should probably be retained. It thus 
appears that the most reasonable and logical approach to 
the current problems would be to modify the present struc­
ture in such a way as to remove wage inequities and abolish 
payment for work not performed. The latter constitutes the 
approach of the railroads.
The carriers' proposals indicate they would like to 
increase the number of miles which make up the basic day 
from 100 to 160 in through freight service (and for engine- 
men in passenger service) and from 150 to 225 miles for 
trainmen in passenger service. The effect is to reduce the 
mileage rates of pay in the first instance by 37.5 per cent 
and by 33.3 per cent in the latter case. In addition the
carriers propose to eliminate overtime in all passenger
7
service.
The labor organizations, on the other hand, propose 
no increases in mileage but rather reductions in the basic 
day. These reductions consist for the most part of six in 
place of eight hours in through freight service (and for
7Ibid.. pp. 186-189 .
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t r a i n m e n  in p a s s e n g e r  service) and four h o u r s  in p l a c e  of
X
five h o u r s  in p a s s e n g e r  e n g i n e m e n  service. T h e y  also favor- 
a b a n d o n i n g  the s p e e d  b a s i s  for o v e r t i m e  and the s u b s t i t u t i o n
g
of p r e m i u m  p a y m e n t  for any time s e r v e d  o v e r  the b a s i c  day. 
T h e  o r g anizations' p r o p o s a l s  w o u l d  result in s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
g r e a t e r  labor costs w i t h o u t  at the same time o f f e r i n g  any 
so l u t i o n s  to the g e n e r a l  problem.
T h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  p r e s e n t  an i m p r o p e r  s p r i n g b o a r d  from 
w h i c h  to at t a c k  the o v e r a l l  p r o b l e m .  The c a r r i e r ' s  p r o ­
p o s a l s  also m a y  r e p r e s e n t  r a t h e r  d u b i o u s  b a s e s  fro m  w h i c h  
to a p p r o a c h  the trouble. O n  reflection, t h e i r  m a i n  c o n t r i ­
b u t i o n  t o w a r d  a s o l u t i o n  lies in the s u g g e s t i o n  to i n c r e a s e  
the b a s i c  mileage, o s t e n s i b l y  in o r d e r  to m o d e r n i z e  the 
s t r u c t u r e  in k e e p i n g  w i t h  the t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n c e s  in 
the industry. A  n u m b e r  of q u e s t i o n s  arise r e g a r d i n g  the 
act u a l  e f f e c t s  of l- j rh a pro p o s a l .  First, w i l l  i n c r e a s i n g  
the m i l e a g e  b ases result in the a b o l i t i o n  of o r  a s i g n i f i ­
can t  r e d u c t i o n  in the i n e q u i t i e s  m e n t i o n e d ?  T h e  m e r e  s u b ­
s t i t u t i o n  of 160 m i l e s  for 100 m i l e s  in the e x a m p l e s  a l r e a d y  
g i v e n  w i l l  not ch a n g e  the s t r u c t u r e  it s e l f  w h i c h  seems to
8Ibid.. p. 188-189.
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be the chief source of the inequities. As the Commission 
9
has suggested, these inequities may continue to be toler­
ated because of the seniority system and because they are 
frequently intercraft in nature. The elimination of them 
would require a virtually complete overhaul of the existing 
compensation structure, something not yet contemplated by 
the carriers.
Aside from the disparities remaining in the system, 
the proposals leave other important questions unanswered. 
The most obvious and significant question is: Will the
railroads' financial position be materially enhanced by the 
proposed changes?
An analysis of the above question may be approached 
on the basis of two different assumptions. The first may 
assume that divisional points are to be changed in con­
formity with the new mileage bases, while the second as­
sumption implies that the divisional points will remain as 
they now are. In the former case, divisions would be so 
constructed as to permit crew changes at distances of 
approximately 160 miles rather than 100 miles. The labor 
cost saving under these conditions would depend to a
^Ibid., p. 241.
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considerable extent on the carriers' ability to actually
establish such divisions. A recent study reveals that they
have been astonishingly unsuccessful so far in relating
their crew changes to the mileage basis. This study is
summarized in part below. It applies only to engineers in
10
through freight service:
Number of Number of Per cent
miles run trips of total
60 and under 30 1.45
61-80 166 8.05
81-100 330 16 .02
Total 0-100 526 25 .52
101-160 1357 65.90
160 and over 176 8.58
Total 2059 100.00
The remainder of the study involving other classifications 
reveals essentially the same pattern.
It is clear that the predominant number of runs 
(65.90 per cent) are already between 100 and 160 miles in 
length. It is equally clear that the railroads, faced with 
the choice of reducing crews and paying pro rata mileage 
allowances or retaining the same number of crews and chang­
ing them at approximately 100 mile intervals, have made the
•^Ibid.. p. 180. This is a study of thirty-one 
selected railroads from July 1, 1060 to December 31, 1960.
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former choice. Presumably the choice is an economically 
prudent one, that is; it is less expensive to have fewer 
crews and pay pro rata mileage to the crews retained.
All of the mileage pro rata now being paid on runs 
between 100 and 160 miles would be saved if the carriers are 
successful in changing the basis as proposed. It is impos­
sible with existing data to say exactly how much would 
actually be saved for all Class I roads but it should not 
be inferred that it would be 65.90 per cent of the total 
compensation now being paid engineers in through freight 
service. The exact amount could only be obtained by cumu­
lating the total dollars of pro rata actually paid in the 
period for each individual run. The study under contempla­
tion has categorized the trips into mileage blocks, while 
in actual practice the runs could be any length between 101 
and 160 miles. Nevertheless, it is apparent that most of 
the runs already exceed the present mileage basis and con­
siderable savings could result from the extension of the 
basis by another sixty miles.
One interesting aspect of the above study is the fact 
that divisions are currently little related to the mileage 
bases. It is apparent from the table that slightly more
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than one-fifth of the runs are quite near the 100 mile stand­
ard with nearly ten per cent less than eighty-one miles and 
roughly three-fourths of the runs over one hundred miles.
Thus, there are at least prima facie grounds upon which to 
conclude that divisions have arisen out of considerations 
other than mileage standards of compensation. These other 
considerations probably include the location of existing 
towns or cities which grew up without regard to the mileage 
bases of railroads although some towns clearly came into 
being because they had been nominated as railroad division 
points. For whatever the reason, it seems clear that other 
considerations than distance have been compelling in most 
cases involving the length of runs and crew changes.
In view of this situation there seems to be little 
reason to believe that there will be any significant shuffling 
of crew-change points. This conclusion was generally con­
firmed by one highly placed railroad official interviewed by 
the writer. He observed that it was impractical to assume 
that the railroads could take some sort of mileage ruler 
and lay out division and change points every 160 miles. He 
implied that conditions peculiar- to nearly every individual 
run has dictated the selection of these locations and not
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t h e  m i l e a g e  standard. T h e  net result is the c r e a t i o n  of an 
a w a r e n e s s  that no imp o r t a n t  savi n g s  m a y  b e  p r e d i c t e d  on the 
b a s i s  of s u b s t a n t i a l  r e d u c t i o n  in c o m p l e t e  c r e w  u n i t s  as a 
re s u l t  of the m o d e r n i z a t i o n  of the m i l e a g e  basis.
The main saving to be realized from an extension of 
the standard is to be found in the abolition of the pro rata 
compensation now being paid on runs from 101-160 miles. All 
runs up to one hundred miles in length would continue to re­
ceive the guaranteed day's pay. The entire proposal is thus 
reduced to an effort to lower the piece-rate (mileage rate) 
by 37.5 per cent through freight service (and engineers in 
passenger service) and 33.3 per cent for trainmen in pas­
senger service.
L i t t l e  fault m a y  be f ound w i t h  the p r o p o s e d  n e w  
s p e e d  b a s i s  itself as it appears to a c c u r a t e l y  reflect p r e s ­
ent t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  in the i n d u s t r y . ^  The p r i m a r y  
aspect of the railroads' p r o p o s a l s  w h i c h  m i g h t  subj e c t  the m
11A study performed by the Presidential Commission 
indicates that through freight speeds average about 23.2 
miles per hour and passenger speeds about 38.5 miles per 
hour. Ibid., p. 223. Also see: Appendix D. This is a
study of a typical coal run on the Illinois Central selec­
ted because it is one of the slower freight runs.
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to criticism, however, is the fact that they do not go to 
the heart of the problem. The crux of the difficulty seem­
ingly originates in the fact that efficient railroad opera­
tions apparently require that runs of greatly varying length 
be made with the same crew. It is the numerous very short 
runs which give rise to payment for work not performed 
(through daily guarantees) and it is the very long runs 
which give rise to excessive daily compensation for some 
crews. Both result in marked inequities in total compensa­
tion for work actually done and encourage charges of "feath­
erbedding." It would seem to follow from this analysis 
that fundamental changes in the dual basis of payment struc­
ture are called for. The carrier proposals do not contemplate 
these kind of changes at the present time.
Recommendations made by the 1962 Presidential Com­
mission include efforts to remedy the most obvious of the 
dual system's shortcomings. In brief, two major changes are 
suggested. The first deals with the problem of the very 
short run— that is, runs up to one hundred miles. These 
runs would be treated as "local freight" and paid for on a 
strict hourly basis as is done currently in yard service.
This would correct the inequity of the guaranteed daily wage.
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The Commission reports that more than half of the local 
freight runs fall into this category so that substantial 
savings are indicated. The second recommended change pro­
vides for the substitution of miles plus hours for miles ^r 
hours in the new dual system proposed. Under this method, 
hourly pay and mileage rates could be bargained for sepa­
rately. The mileage rate would not be obtained by dividing 
the daily rate by the mileage standard as at present. This 
would introduce flexibility into the structure since hours 
could be emphasized in those situations where hours are the 
more equitable basis of pay and mileage rates would be given 
greater importance in the areas indicated.
Under this system overtime based on speed could be 
eliminated and, instead, paid for after eight hours at 
premium rates. Mileage run beyond the 160 mile standard 
indicated by the Commission would be additionally compensated 
for at an "overmile" rate which is recommended to be one and 
one-half times the negotiated mileage rate. Excess hours 
due to slowdowns and stoppages of one kind or another would 
be compensated for at the customary premium overtime while 
longer hours due to excess mileage and/or slowdowns and 
stoppages would be additionally paid for at the "overmile"
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rate. The purpose of the dual treatment of overtime is to 
introduce selectivity into the system and thus provide for 
a more equitable compensation system from the viewpoint of 
both sides.^
While the Presidential Commission's recommendations 
as above described go far beyond the proposals of either 
the carriers or the organizations in reducing inequities 
created by the old system it continues to rely on the ex­
tension in the mileage standard as proposed by the railroads 
for financial relief. This is clearly revealed from the 
example used by the Commission as an aid in explaining the 
proposed new structure. In this example, which assumes an
engineer in through freight service, a 180 miles, ten hour
13
run would result in a payment of $46.34.
Hours: Basic Pay (8 h r s . x $3.1925).......$25.53
Overtime (2 x $4,787)   9,57
Miles: Mileage Rate (60 x $.12485).......  7.49
Overmileage R a t e  (20 x $ . 18728) . . . . 3.75
Total $46.34
It should be pointed out that the $0.12485 mileage
rate used in the above example for mileage between 100-160 
miles is only a suggested rate (actually one-half of the 
current mileage rate) and would be negotiated. Under the
12Ibid.. pp. 242-245. 
13Ibid.. p. 246 .
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present system the compensation for this run would be as
follows:
Hours: Basic Pay (8 hrs . x $3.1925)......... $25.53
Overtime ..........................  ...
Miles: Mileage Rate (80 x .2553) ..........  20.06
Total $45.59
The main reason for the smaller total under the ex­
isting structure than under the Commission's proposed struc­
ture is that no overtime would commence on a run of 180 
miles at present until after twelve hours and forty-eight 
minutes had elapsed. Under the compensation bases proposed 
by the carriers the pay for this run would be as indicated
below:
Hours: Basic Pay (8 hrs. x $3.1925)  $25.53
Overtime (1 hr. x $4.7897)   4.79
Miles: Mileage Rate (20 x $.1596)   3 .19
Total $33.51
The speed basis for overtime under the new proposal 
of the railroads is twenty miles per hour and thus one hour 
of overtime would be paid for at premium rates in the above 
example.
It is apparent from the above analysis that no sav­
ings would accrue to the railroads from runs in excess of
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the eight hour daily standard if the Commission's proposals 
were adopted. This is primarily due to the increased em­
phasis on the premium treatment of extra long runs and 
excessive hours. Savings remain, however, with respect to 
runs between 100 and 160 miles assuming the negotiated 
mileage rate were reduced by one-half as has been assumed 
by the Commission in their example referred to above. The 
savings could be substantial since about two-thirds of the 
present runs are indicated to be in this range Some of 
the savings might be offset by the more liberal treatment 
of overtime, however.
The carrier's proposal would result in substantially 
greater savings than that of the Commission inasmuch as it 
proposes to reduce the mileage rates on the average between 
one-third and 37.5 per cent. No savings would accrue on 
runs shorter than one hundred miles since the basic day's 
compensation continues to be guaranteed and the savings ob­
tained from runs between 100 and 160 miles would be offset 
in some degree by additional overtime payment resulting, in 
this case, from the increased speed bases. Conclusions re­
garding the overall effect of these rules and their proposed 
changes are reserved to the final chapter.
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C o n s i s t  of road c r e w ^ . W h i l e  some doubt t ends to 
o b s c u r e  the p u b l i c ' s  image of " f eatherbedding" in c o n n e c t i o n  
w i t h  the c o m p e n s a t i o n  s t r u c t u r e  e v a l u a t e d  above, t h e r e  a p ­
p e a r s  to be little of this d u b i o u s  q u a l i t y  in its v i e w  of 
the m a k e u p  of r a i l r o a d  crews, p a r t i c u l a r l y  that of the f i r e ­
m a n  on d i e s e l  locomotives. Part of the d oubt a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  the p a y  str u c t u r e  is u n q u e s t i o n a b l y  due to the g e n e r a l  
l ack of u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of h o w  the s y s t e m ' w o r k s . Thi s  can n o t  
be said of the m a n n i n g  structure, however. It is o b v i o u s  
that t here is no w o r k  for f i r e m e n  to p e r f o r m  o n  an engine 
w h e r e  t here are no fires to attend (although t here are indeed 
fires as anyone can t e s t i f y  w h o  has w a l k e d  t h r o u g h  the n a r r o w  
p a s s a g e w a y s  of e n g i n e r o o m s  w h i l e  t r a v e l i n g  n e a r l y  one h u n ­
d r e d  m i l e s  p e r  h o u r ) . T hus the consist q u e s t i o n  is g e n e r a l l y  
r e g a r d e d  as the c l e a r e s t  e x a m p l e  of "make-work" o n  the r a i l ­
roads. A  b r i e f  e v a l u a t i o n  of the w o r k  status of f i r e m e n  
f o l l o w s :
T h e  labor o r g a n i z a t i o n s  h a v e  c o n t e n d e d  for some time 
that the f i r e m a n  does, in fact, p e r f o r m  seve r a l  u s e f u l  and 
n e c e s s a r y  functions. T h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  may r e a s o n a b l y  be 
g r o u p e d  as follows: (1) the lookout function, (2) the
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mechanical function and, (3) the engineer relief function. 
Before proceeding to analyze these functions it should be 
recalled from previous discussions that the carriers have 
never seriously proposed the elimination of the fireman on 
passenger trains and for this reason the analysis is confined 
to through and local freight service. It was clear to the 
author, although the limited nature of the trip experiences 
is readily acknowledged, that the "so-called" "headend" 
brakeman was nearly always in the cab of the locomotive 
along with the fireman and engineer. In the absence of a 
fireman he could logically perform any lookout function that 
is required. The need for a left-side lookout would appear 
to be more urgent in local freight service where more 
switching activity occurs.
With respect to the safety factor, prudence dictates 
that any and all persons or devices available should be uti­
lized to reduce hazards. This view has been summarized by 
one of the Commissioners as follows:
He alone is able to see what is transpiring on the 
left side of the train. When the engineer is look­
ing forward or backward, the fireman is looking in 
the opposite direction to see what obstacles, if
^ A n  excellent discussion of these functions may be 
found in the Presidential Commission's Report, Ibid. , pp. 
66-79 .
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any, are in the path of tne train. Thus the fireman 
must look for pedestrian and vehicular traffic at or 
approaching grade crossings, signal indications, con­
ditions of the right of way, obstructions on the 
track, ground men, including repair crews, as well 
as unauthorized persons and children playing along 
the tracks. 15
The author was present at a preview of a movie which 
was later used as a carrier exhibit before the Presidential 
Commission and which tended to vitiate most of the safety 
claims made by the organizations. The movie depicted a 
train on a standard run which was manned by only an engineer 
and front-end, left-riding brakeman and a rear-end conduc­
tor . The actual conditions encountered on the trip indi­
cated that the safety factor was in close control with this 
consist.
The second function frequently referred to by the 
organizations as being necessarily performed by the fireman 
is concerned with moving malfunctions of a mechanical 
nature. There is a considerable difference of opinion as 
to the frequency of engine room "alarms" or other evidence 
of malfunctions and to the ability of the fireman to correct 
these conditions when they do occur. The Commission
1 5“^ Dissenting Report of Commissioner S. C. Phillips, 
Ibid., pp. 356-7.
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concluded that they "involve a small proportion of the total
time on duty, are relatively minor, and are not essential
to safe operation. The infrequent minor malfunctions which
do occur can be handled by the engineer. If they are more
serious the services of skilled maintenance personnel called
to handle the emergency will still be required, as at pres- 
16
ent."
The third function ostensibly performed by the fire­
man is the relief of the engineer in the event of the death 
or disability of the engineer when the train is in motion. 
Evidence indicates that the incidence of such occurrences 
is quite low and it is also apparent that any crewman is 
capable of bringing the train to a halt.
From the very brief analysis of the function of the 
fireman on freight diesel locomotives one might well con­
clude that the classification cannot continue to be justi­
fied. The Commission was of this view and recommended that 
firemen be assigned only at the railroads' discretion after 
July 1, 1962. This is equivalent to recommending that fire­
men be used only on passenger locomotives after that date.
•^Ibid . , p . 77 .
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It f u r t h e r  r e c o m m e n d e d  that f i r e m e n  h i r e d  since the carriers' 
n o t i c e  in 1959 be r e l i e v e d  of d u t y  a fter October, 1962, and 
all f i r e m e n  u n d e r  the age of t w e n t y - f i v e  b e  s e p a r a t e d  after 
J u l y  1, 1962. F i r e m e n  w i t h  less t h a n  ten y ears s e r v i c e  
s h o u l d  be f u r l o u g h e d  after J u l y  1, 1963, a c c o r d i n g  to this 
same r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .
P r o t e c t i o n  of s e n i o r i t y  and o t h e r  rights for all 
t e r m i n a t e d  f i r e m e n  are reco m m e n d e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  a s e p a r a t i o n  
g u a r a n t e e  of s i x t y  p e r  cent of hi s  last y e a r ' s  a v e r a g e  
m o n t h l y  c o m p e n s a t i o n  for up to t h i r t y - s i x  m o n t h s  (for ten 
years' service) after separa t i o n .  W h i l e  the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
p r o p o s a l s  appear reasonable, a s s u m i n g  the n e e d  to a b o l i s h  
the p o s ition, the q u e s t i o n  of the ext e n t  of its f i n a n c i a l  
effect on r a i l r o a d  r e v e n u e  rema i n s  l a r g e l y  u n a n s w e r e d .  E s t i ­
m a t e s  m i g h t  be made, and h a v e  b e e n  m a d e  in the cas e  study,
of the savi n g s  w h i c h  c o u l d  accrue t h r o u g h  the c o m p l e t e  aban-
17
d o n m e n t  of the fire m a n  p o s i t i o n  in freight service. T his 
assumes, however, that all e x i s t i n g  frei g h t  f i r e m e n  w o u l d
17The 1960 savings using the statistical mean used 
in the projection would have been $103,646,345 or approxi­
mately one hundred million dollars annually.
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be t e r m i n a t e d  at a g i v e n  time, an a s s u m p t i o n  w h i c h  is p r o b ­
ably invalid. F i r s t  of all, s e n i o r i t y  w o u l d  l i k e l y  result 
in "bumping" down, that is, the r e p l a c e m e n t  of f i r e m e n  into 
l o w e r  r a t e d  jobs, p o s s i b l y  y ard jobs. In t h e s e  cases the 
savings w o u l d  be m a d e  at the lower rate rather tha n  at the 
e x i s t i n g  f i r e m a n  rate. Secondly, strong p r e s s u r e s  f rom 
o r g a n i z e d  labor and p o s s i b l y  g o v e r n m e n t  a g e ncies w o u l d  p r o b ­
ably m i l i t a t e  against any r a p i d  or w h o l e s a l e  s e p a r a t i o n s  from 
the service. Suc h  wa s  the C a n a d i a n  e x p e r i e n c e .  Thus, the 
m o s t  lik e l y  result of n e g o t i a t i o n s  w o u l d  not leave the issue 
at the c o m p l e t e  d i s c r e t i o n  of r a i l r o a d  m a n a g e m e n t .  T r a n s ­
fers into l o w e r - r a t e d  jobs and s c h e d u l e d  r e m o v a l  of fire m e n  
o v e r  r e l a t i v e l y  long p e r i o d s  of time c o u p l e d  w i t h  s u ggested 
t e r m i n a l  p a y  e x t e n d e d  o v e r  m o n t h s  or eve n  years w o u l d  g r e a t ­
ly d i m i n i s h  the e s t i m a t e d  savings. T h e r e  is no r e a s o n a b l e  
m e t h o d  w h e r e b y  this figure c o u l d  eve n  b e  a p p r o x i m a t e d  on an 
ad ho c  basis. C o n c l u s i o n s  are d i s c u s s e d  in the final c h a p ­
ter .
M i n o r  rules r e g a r d i n g  c o m p e n s a t i o n . Th e  r e m a i n d e r  
of the w o r k i n g  rules that h a v e  come u n d e r  a t t e n t i o n  t h r o u g h ­
out this study m a y  be t r e a t e d  u n d e r  one heading, not b e c a u s e
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t he y  are u n i m p o r t a n t  or r e a d i l y  solu b l e  bu t  b e c a u s e  t hey 
r e p r e s e n t  a r e l a t i v e l y  m i n o r  sa v i n g  w h e n  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  the 
dual b a s i s  sy s t e m  of p a y  and c o n s i s t  of crews q u e stion. The 
m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  of t hese rules are the a r b i t r a r i e s  or c o n ­
s t r u c t i v e  a l l o w a n c e s  n o w  b e i n g  p a i d  for w o r k  w h i c h  is p a r ­
t i c u l a r l y  d i f f i c u l t  or arduous, or for c e r t a i n  delays. The 
c a r r i e r s  h a v e  p r o p o s e d  to e l i m i n a t e  all such rules w h i c h  
w o u l d  come into c o n f l i c t  w i t h  a m i l e a g e  o r  d a i l y  g u arantee.  
T h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w i s h  to r e t a i n  t h e m  but conv e r t  t h e m  fro m  
m o n e y  or m i l e a g e  p a y m e n t s  to h o u r s  of pay. F o r  example, 
i n s t e a d  of a flat f i f t y  cents for c o u p l i n g  air hose, the 
actual time r e q u i r e d  in the c o u p l i n g  w o u l d  b e  p a i d  for at 
the c r e w m a n ' s  g o i n g  rate.
The C o m m i s s i o n  has r e c o m m e n d e d  that c e r t a i n  s w i t c h ­
ing a r b i t r a r i e s  be eliminated, namely: (a) init i a l  terminal,
(b) i n t e r m e d i a t e  yard, and (c) final t e r m i n a l  switching. 
Initial and final t e r m i n a l  d e l a y  rules w o u l d  be e l i m i n a t e d
as a result of this r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  but o n l y  in local freight
18
service w h e r e  r e g u l a r  h o u r l y  rates w o u l d  p r e v a i l  anyway.
In g e n e r a l  the C o m m i s s i o n  feels that s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s  of the
18Presidential Commission, o p . cit. , p. 255.
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present complex structure might be the most important result 
of modification of the arbitraries.
The second most significant of the minor rules, at 
least from the expense standpoint, are the graduated rate 
scales based on engine weight or number of cars hauled. The 
carriers have proposed a single rate which would be the 
average rate now being paid. The Commission proposes a com-
19
bined "weight on drivers or units plus car length brackets." 
This would have the advantage of leaving the total earnings 
in this respect largely unaffected for individual crew 
members. The carrier proposal would not change the total 
compensation effect but could result in considerable vari­
ations in individual pay rates.
The financial effect of modification of these minor 
working rules on rail revenues is exceedingly difficult to 
estimate unless it be proposed they be done away with alto­
gether; that is, abolition of all delay pay, deadheading 
compensation and the reduction of graduated rate scales to 
the negotiated daily rate. These were the assumptions used 
in computing the total excess expense attributed to these 
working rules in the case study. On that basis and from
-*-9Ibid. , p. 254.
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the results o b t a i n e d  f r o m  the s t u d y  the t otal savings to
all G l a s s  I rai l r o a d s  w o u l d  b e  in the n e i g h b o r h o o d  of f ifty
20
m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  annually. T h e r e  is n o  r e a s o n  to expect 
that t hese r ules w o u l d  b e  o r  c o u l d  b e  abolished, however, 
w i t h o u t  r e c o u r s e  to some s u b s t i t u t e  such as a d d i t i o n a l  h o u r l y  
c o m p e n s a t i o n .  T h e s e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  in the 
c o n c l u d i n g  chapter.
20
T h e  actual amount u s i n g  the s t a t i s t i c a l  m e a n  is 
$46,380,196.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has proceeded on the assumption that the 
nation's railroads are in a state of financial decline seri­
ous enough to warrant intensive investigation into the 
causes of the difficulty. It is anticipated that such in­
vestigations may form the bases for remedial action. In 
recognition of the unusual complexity of the many problems 
associated with the railroads' failing financial health, 
the study has been limited to one facet of the overall 
problem, that of the troubled area of labor costs most 
frequently referred to as "featherbedding."
Having established the fact of the railroads' finan­
cial difficulties in the early chapters, succeeding chapters 
have (a) analyzed the structure and character of those work­
ing rules generally alleged to contain "make-work" charac­
teristics, (b) reported the findings of the case study of 
a representative railroad and projected these findings to 
all Class I roads, and (c) evaluated the rules and their
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financial effects on railroad revenue through a review of 
various proposals for remedy. The remainder of this chapter 
will consist of a very brief summary of the findings of the 
study followed by the conclusions drawn from them.
Summary of Findings
A review of statistical data reported by the Inter­
state Commerce Commission on a monthly and annual basis and 
from some secondary sources confirmed in Chapter II the 
original assumption that the nation's railroads have been 
in a very unfortunate financial position for some time. The 
study has attempted to analyze briefly the multiple forces 
which have given rise to the difficulty in order to reveal 
the unusual complexity of the railroads' problems. The con­
clusion was drawn that forces outside of railroad manage­
ments' discretion were probably primarily responsible for 
the trouble. The most fundamental of these forces have been 
changes in technology, in the demand for railroad services, 
and severe competition from other transportation agencies, 
particularly the trucking industry.
After entering the decade under study in an unde­
sirable financial position, the railroads found themselves
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by the close of 1960 in a virtually untenable situation. 
Total revenue for all Glass I roads was down well over one 
billion dollars below the high point of the decade which oc­
curred in 1953. Net railway operating income was only ap­
proximately three-fifths of the average for the decade by 
the end of the period. Freight revenues declined about 
twelve per cent over the period while passenger revenues 
dropped even more noticeably, nearly forty per cent. This 
all occurred in spite of numerous rate increases which 
tended to offset somewhat the loss of traffic. Rate in­
creases have proved to be of dubious benefit, however, since 
they have frequently resulted in demand-substitution for the 
services offered by the railroads. A study of the recent 
financial history of the Illinois Central Railroad, which 
was the source of the case study, revealed a similar pat­
tern .
While there is undoubtedly some merit to the Organ­
ization charges that the railroads have been slow to apply 
remedial action, in general it may be concluded that they 
have applied technological gains to the industry about as 
fast as their inadequate financial structure would permit. 
The result has been notable improvement in service at lower
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unit costs. In spite of these gains traffic has continued 
to move from the railroads to other modes of carriage re­
sulting in considerable excess capacity and a continuing 
decline in the industry's financial strength.
Apparently unable to solve their problems through 
the acquisition of additional traffic the railroads have con­
centrated a part of their attention on reducing costs . One 
area which has given promise of significant cost reduction 
is that dealing with certain working rules which, because 
of the technological achievements in the industry, appear 
to contain "make-work" characteristics. It has been the 
purpose of this study to analyze these rules in an effort 
to determine (a) the reasonableness of the "featherbedding" 
charges directed against them, and (b) the quantitative 
significance of the costs associated with them.
One of the prime difficulties which has surrounded 
any attempt to study railroad costs is the fact that the 
figures have been generally unavailable, at least in a 
form which would permit a close analysis of particular costs. 
In order to overcome this problem a rather detailed study 
was made of a representative railroad, the Illinois Central 
System. The analysis was confined to road service employees
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and involved costs relating to five specific areas of exist­
ing working rules.
Taken in order the study revealed (a) the dual basis 
of compensation as established some forty years ago is un­
realistic in light of technological changes which have oc­
curred since then, particularly as regards the speed bases 
used in computing the payments. Two different methods were 
utilized in approaching the problem of excess compensation 
resulting from the dualistic nature of the structure and 
the outmoded speed bases. First, the compensation was com­
puted on a straight hourly wage basis. Admittedly, this 
would make for an inequitable wage structure, but it was 
calculated because of the widespread belief that road service 
employees can be paid on such a basis. The second approach 
to the computation of excess wage payments was to retain the 
basic structure of both hours and mileage but to substitute 
the actual average speed for the contractual speed bases 
established many years ago. The decade 1951-60 was studied 
mainly to make certain that the most recent year, 1960, was 
closely representative. The two different approaches to 
the calculations revealed similar results and were averaged 
in order to produce a single amount which was used in a
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later summation. On the above basis the excess compensation 
that could be attributed to the current wage structure on 
the Illinois Central Railroad for I960 was nearly five mil­
lion dollars.
(b) The second major set of rules which was investi­
gated was that dealing with the consist, or make-up, of 
road crews. The most obvious example is that of the fireman 
on diesel locomotives. The term "fireman" is itself mis­
leading since no firing duties are required. The title 
"fireman-helper" is now in common usage for the classifi­
cation and it tends to emphasize the new role of the fireman 
which is mainly that of rendering assistance to the engineer. 
It has been generally recommended for safety reasons that 
he remain on the passenger engine but not on the freight 
locomotive. Assuming that the freight fireman position were 
abolished, a total of about two and one-half million dol­
lars could be saved annually on the Illinois Central. The 
case of the excess brakeman is far from clear but most rail 
authorities have argued that one of the two brakemen found 
on most trains (three in full-crew states) may be elimi­
nated without seriously impairing either safety or effi­
ciency. On this assumption the study arbitrarily reduced
1
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the compensation of brakemen by one-half. Thus, by reducing 
freight crews to an engineer, brakeman and conductor, and 
passenger crews to an engineer, fireman, baggageman, one 
brakeman and a conductor, slightly over five and one-half 
million dollars in compensation would have been eliminated 
from the total paid by the railroad in 1960. This repre­
sented about one-fourth of the total compensation for road 
service employees. It should be carefully noted, however, 
that all savings would not accrue to the railroad because 
of the necessity of providing additional safety devices, 
such as "dead man switches" and "walkie-talkie" radio equip­
ment .
(c) The remaining three working rule areas studied, 
which were (1 ) arbitraries or constructive allowances, (2 ) 
payments due to graduated rate scales, and (3) monthly 
guarantees, when calculated amounted to somewhat over one 
million dollars annually. This was roughly ten per cent 
of the eleven and one-half million dollar total related to 
these working rules for the year. The figure is approxi­
mately one-half of total road service compensation on the 
Railroad for 1960.
One hoped for result of making a detailed study of 
a representative railroad was additional insight into the
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financial effects the rules have had on the revenue of all 
Glass I railroads through a projection of the findings. In 
the preceding chapter the statistical validity of such a 
projection was established, primarily on an a-priori basis. 
Five areas of comparison were studied and projections made 
on the basis of each. Total excess expense for all roads 
was then estimated to be somewhere between 427 million dol­
lars and 494 million dollars. For analytical purposes a 
statistical mean was developed which indicated that a rough 
approximation of the expense associated with these rules 
is 460 million dollars, a figure which tends to support 
mathematically the railroads' allegation that the rules cost 
them a half-billion dollars annually.
Essential to the usefulness of the study, however, 
is the determination of whether or not the rules do con­
sist of "featherbedding" techniques and, assuming they do, 
may they be modified in such a way as to provide the finan­
cial remedy which the carriers seek? The previous chapter 
has evaluated the rules with a view to analyzing them in 
terms of possible solutions. A very recent and thorough 
report by the Presidential Railroad Commission has evaluated 
the rules and offered recommendations for solving the
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problems associated with them. This very important study 
was utilized along with the present investigation in arriv­
ing at the conclusions which follow.
Conclusions
From the foregoing it now appears certain that the 
costs associated with "make-work" rules, as defined by the 
railroads, are significant enough to have important effects 
on rail net revenue. It should be noted, however, that a 
rather loose interpretation has been put on the term "make- 
work." If the definition is restricted to "payment for 
work not actually performed or for unnecessary work," the 
dual basis of pay system, deadheading, necessary and un­
avoidable delay and graduated rate scales may not logically 
be referred to as "make-work" or "featherbedding." Thus, 
although the compensation structure in general does not 
possess any significant "make-work" characteristics, it is 
badly outdated, unnecessarily complex, and piece-meal in 
nature.
Taken individually it appears that the main com­
plaint regarding the compensation structure is that the 
speed bases are so technologically outdated that they result 
in grossly excessive payments. A second, yet still
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significant, criticism is directed at the payment of numer­
ous special allowances (arbitraries) for work which the 
railroads feel should be performed as a normal part of the 
crewman's duties. The key to an answer to these criticisms 
may be found in another question: Do unions negotiate for
hourly or daily wages or for annual compensation? Ostensi­
bly they negotiate for the former but it is the latter which 
they find compelling. In some industries which may have 
very stable and routine work assignments the question may 
well be moot. In the railroad industry and for road crews 
in particular the question is vital. Road service does not 
operate on an eight-hour day, five-day week. Thus while 
individual rules may appear to result in unreasonable and 
excessive compensation, it is the entire income a worker 
makes in a year that counts. When the perspective is total 
rather than partial very different conclusions may be drawn. 
For example, while all railroad employees averaged $5,659.68 
in 1960, auto workers averaged $6,146.40, blast furnace 
and basic steel averaged $6,034.76 and petroleum refining 
averaged $6,407.44 (see Appendix E for details and source). 
This is for all non-supervisory employees and, of course, 
does not accurately reflect the annual earnings by individual
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classification. The difficulty in attempting to show the 
latter is that there is no reasonable way to compare a rail­
road engineer with a brickmason in a petroleum refinery or 
a hot-mill operator in a steel mill. The natures of the 
jobs are too varied to render valid comparisons but it seems 
safe to assume that all industries have these highly-rated 
jobs which call for unusual skill or involve considerable 
responsibility. The high hourly rates ascribed to some rail­
road crewmen, particularly enginemen and conductors on pas­
senger service, are the result of dividing total annual 
compensation by the straight time hours actually worked.
But this is no different than the high rates which would 
result from the same method being applied to, say, a hot-mill 
operator in a steel mill who makes thirty-eight dollars a 
day but works only four hours each day because of the nature 
of the work which is unique to his industry. Thus, if the 
incomes of road service employees on the nation’s railroads 
are not significantly higher than incomes for comparable oc­
cupations in other heavy equipment industries fault will 
have to be found with none or all.
None of the above is intended to imply that the com­
pensation structure of the railroads is not badly in need of
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revision. The conclusion is, however, that while moderni­
zation and modification will result in a sounder and more 
equitable structure, they are not likely to greatly reduce 
labor costs. It does not appear likely that the labor or­
ganizations will negotiate away a portion of their annual 
income when it cannot be shown by existing data that the 
income is itself excessive. To force such a decision on them 
by legislative action would be equivalent to asking a par­
ticular group of railroad workers to subsidize the industry 
through the sacrifice of a portion of what now appears to be 
a reasonable annual income.
The consist of crews question is quite another matter. 
If the firemen on freight diesel engines and one of the 
brakemen on all trains perform no necessary function then 
a clear case of "make-work" is demonstrated. This belief 
is mainly predicated on the reductio ad absurdum argument.
That is, there are no fires to tend nor brakes to set. This 
argument is not to be disdained but there are important 
questions of safety to lives and the protection of expensive 
equipment and merchandise. Solutions to these questions, 
however, are based on value-judgment, and the problem does 
not lend itself to economic analysis. There are further
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significant questions of what to do about the thousands of 
men who would become unemployed if the positions were abol­
ished. It is reasonable to assume that they are entitled 
to at least transitional economic security, but how much 
and for how long? For the purposes of this study the im­
portant phase of these questions lies in the effect continued 
costs will have on railroad net revenue. A program of par­
tial pay extending over several years to terminated employ­
ees would offset a large portion of the expected savings.
The revenue problems of the railroads seem to be a "here 
and now" situation— at least for some. Railroad officials 
interviewed privately expressed their fear that the antici­
pated victory on the consist question may turn out to be 
largely meaningless to many roads which are on the borderline 
of bankruptcy and need immediate help.
In final summary it may be concluded that while the 
compensation structure is badly outdated and unnecessarily 
complex, actual cost savings will only partially accrue as 
a result of modification of the structure. Very signifi­
cant savings would only come about at the expense of seri­
ously diminishing the annual income of the employees 
concerned— income which is not at present grossly excessive
when compared to similar industries. Thus nearly one-half 
of the proposed half-billion dollar annual savings may be 
more mythical than real. Added to the generally gloomy out­
look for the carriers is the fact that the savings associ­
ated with the abolishment of certain crew positions will 
only be partial, at least for a period of a few years. This 
analysis suggests that in place of a saving of some 500 
million dollars annually, a rather optimistic estimate might 
place the figure at closer to 150 million dollars assuming 
successful negotiations on the part of the railroads.
It is to be expected that the above figure will 
represent only token relief for the carriers at best and 
should not be considered a panacea for the railroads' finan­
cial problems. Nevertheless, there is urgent need for a 
beginning to the solution to these problems. Negotiations 
commencing immediately and carried on in good faith would 
go far toward convincing the public that both the railroads 
and the rail Brotherhoods are sincerely and vitally con­
cerned with the preservation of the nation's most important 
mode of transportation. Much can be achieved by (a) alter­
ing the compensation structure in such a way as to provide 
realistic and comprehensible bases for payment, and (b)
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reviewing the entire manning requirements for trains. In 
the first instance an upward revision in wage scales may be 
necessary to maintain an equitable income structure. In 
the second case it will be necessary, in all j-ustice, to 
provide some economic security for those crewmen whose jobs 
are abolished. Above all, it is necessary to understand 
that:
The troubles in our transportation system are deep; 
and no just and comprehensive set of goals— which 
meets all the needs of each mode of transportation 
as well as shippers, consumers, taxpayers and the 
general public— can be quickly or easily reached.
But few areas of public concern are more basic to 
our progress as a nation . . . The difficulty and
the complexity of these basic troubles will not 
correct themselves with the mere passage of time.
On the contrary, we cannot afford to delay further. 
Facing up to the realities of the situation, we 
must begin to make the painful decisions necessary 
to providing the transportation system required by 
the United States of today and tomorrow.^
-*-John F. Kennedy, Message from the President of the 
United States Relative to the Transportation System of Our 
Nation, House Document No. 384, 87th Cong., 2nd. Sess. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, April 5, 1962),
p. 17
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APPENDIX A
TABLE SHOWING TIME AFTER WHICH OVERTIME ACCRUES ON RUNS 100 
TO 199 MILES IN LENGTH, ON SPEED BASIS OF 12^ MILES PER HOUR
Dis- Over- Dis- Over- Dis- Over- Dis- Over-
tance time tance time tance time tance time
Miles accrues
after
Hours
Miles accrues
after
Hours
Miles accrues
after
Hours
Miles accrues
after
Hours
100 8:00 125 10:00 150 12:00 175 14:00
101 8:05 126 10:05 151 12 :05 176 14:05
102 8:10 127 10:10 152 12 :10 177 14:10
103 8:14 128 10:14 153 12 :14 178 14:14
104 8:19 129 10:19 154 12 :19 179 14:19
105 8:24 130 10:24 155 12 :24 180 14:24
106 8:29 131 10:29 156 12 :29 181 14:29
107 8:34 132 10:34 157 12 :34 182 14:34
108 8:38 133 10:38 158 12 :38 183 14:38
109 8:43 134 10:43 159 12 :43 184 14 :43
110 8 :48 135 10:48 160 12 :48 185 14:48
111 8:53 136 10:53 161 12 :53 186 14:53
112 8:58 137 10:58 162 12 :58 187 14:58
113 9:02 138 11:02 163 13 :02 188 15:02
114 9 :07 139 11:07 164 13 :07 189 15:07
115 9:12 140 11:12 165 13:12 190 15:12
116 9:17 141 11:17 166 13:17 191 15 :17
117 9:22 142 11:22 167 13 :22 192 15 :22
118 9:26 143 11:26 168 13 :26 193 15 :26
119 9:31 144 11:31 169 13 :31 194 15:31
120 9:36 145 11:36 170 13 :36 195 15:36
121 9:41 146 11:41 171 13 :41 196 15 :41
122 9:46 147 11:46 172 13 :46 197 15:46
123 9:50 148 11:50 173 13 ;50 198 15 :50
124 9:55 149 11:55 174 13 :55 199 15 :55
Source: Schedule of Wages of Locomotive Engineers,
Illinois Central Railroad, March 1, 1953, p. 95.
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APPENDIX A (2)
TABLE SHOWING TIME AND ONE-HALF OVERTIME EXPRESSED 
IN MILES (18-3/4 MILES). APPLICABLE ONLY 
TO SERVICE FOR WHICH FREIGHT RATE APPLIES
H r .:Min. Miles H r .:Min. JMiles Hr.:Min. Miles H r .:Min. Miles
3 1 2 :05 39 4:06 77 6:05 114
6 2 2 :08 40 4:10 78 6:08 115
10 3 2 :11 41 4:13 79 6:11 116
13 4 2 :14 42 4 ; 16 80 6 :14 117
16 5 2 :18 43 4:19 81 6 :18 118
19 6 2 :21 44 4:22 82 6:21 119
22 7 2 :24 45 4:26 83 6:24 120
26 8 2 :27 46 4 :29 84 6:27 121
29 . 9 2:30 47 4:32 85 6:30 122
32 10 2 :34 48 4:35 86 6 :34 123
35 11 2 :37 49 4:38 87 6 :37 124
38 12 2 :40 50 4:42 88 6 :40 125
42 13 2 :43 51 4:45 89 6:43 126
45 14 2 :46 52 4 :48 90 6 :46 127
48 15 2 :50 53 4:51 91 6 :50 128
51 16 2 :53 54 4 :54 92 6:53 129
54 17 2 :56 55 4:58 93 6 :56 130
58 18 2 :59 56 5 :01 94 6 :59 131
1 :01 19 3 :02 57 5:04 95 7 :02 132
1:04 20 3 :06 58 5 :07 96 7 :06 133
1 :07 21 3 :09 59 5 :10 97 7 :09 134
1 :10 22 3:12 60 5 :14 98 7 :12 135
1:14 23 3:15 61 5:17 99 7 :15 136
1:17 24 3 :18 62 5 :20 100 7 :18 137
1:20 25 3 :22 63 5 :23 101 1 : 2 2 138
1 :23 26 3 :25 64 5 :26 102 1 :25 139
1 :26 27 3 :28 65 5 :30 103 7 :28 140
1:30 28 3 :31 66 5 :33 104 7 :31 141
1:33 29 3 :34 67 5 :36 105 7 :34 142
1:36 30 3 :38 68 5:39 106 7 :38 143
1:39 31 3 :41 69 5:42 107 7 :41 144
1:42 32 3 :44 70 5 :46 108 7 :44 145
1:46 33 3 :47 71 5:49 109 7 :47 14-6
1 :49 34 3:50 72 5 :52 110 7 :50 147
1:52 35 3 :54 73 5:55 111 7 :54 148
1 :55 36 3 :57 74 5 :58 112 7 :57 149
1:58 37 4 :00 75 6 :02 113 8:00 150
2 :02 38 4 :03 76
Source: Schedule of Waqes of Locomotive Engineers,
Illinois Central Railroad , March 1, 1953 , P. 96.
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APPENDIX B
DISPATCH FREIGHT SCHEDULE 
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD
Chicago to East S t . Louis
CS-3 CS-7 CS-5
L - Chicago 7:00 P
L - Markham 9:00 A 8:10 P 10:00 P
Richton 9:30 A 8:30 P 10:30 P
A - Clinton (E.Jct) 1:40 P 11:45 P 2 :15 A
L - Clinton 2 :10 P 1:45 A 3 :30 A
A - Madison 8:00 P 5:45 A 7 :30 A
A E . S t . Louis 9 :00 P 7 :00 A 8:30 A
East S t . Louis to Chicago
SC-2 SC-4 SC-6
L - E. St. Louis "B" 3 :00 P 12:30 A 5 :00 A
L - Madison 3 :40 P 1:15 A 5:45 A
A - Clinton 7 :40 P 5:40 A 12:30 P
L - Clinton (E.Jct) 8:30 P 6:25 A 2 :00 P
Richton 11:30 P 10:00 A 7:15 P
A - Markham 12:01 A 10:30 A 8:00 P
A - Congress S t . 1:20 A
Meridian to Shreveport Shreveport to Meridian
MS-9 SM-2
9:30 P L - Meridian A - 9:30 P
1:15 A A - Jackson,M. L - 6:30 P
3 :30 A L - Jackson,M. A - 6:10 P
6:30 A A - Vicksburg L - 4:50 P
9:00 A L - Vicksburg A - 3:50 P
4:00 P A - Shreveport L - 10:00 A
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APPENDIX C 
RATES OF PAY EFFECTIVE MARCH 1, 1961 
ENGINEERS 
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD
Weight on D,rivers
Passenger 
Per 100 
Miles
Freight 
Per 100 
Miles
Local 
Per 100 
Miles
Less than 100,000 lbs. $20.26
100,000 — 140,000 lbs. 20.35 $21.79 $22 .35
140.000 - 170,000 lbs. 20.43
170.000 - 200,000 lbs. 20.52 22 .22 22 .78
200,000 - 250,000 lbs. 20.61 22 .39 22.95
250,000 — 300,000 lbs. 20.69 22.54 23 .10
300.000 — 350.000 lbs. 20.78 22 .6$ 23 .25
3 50.000 - 400.000 lbs . 20.86 22 .90 23 .46
400,000 — 450,000 lbs. 20.95 23 .11 23.57
450,000 — 500,000 lbs. 21.04 23 .32 23 .88
500,000 - 550,000 lbs . 21.12 23 .53 24.09
550,000 - 600,000 lbs . 21.21 23.71 24.27
600,000 — 650,000 lbs. 21.29 23 .89 24.45
650,000 — 700,000 lbs. 21.38 24.07 24.63
700.000 - 750,000 lbs. 21.46 24.25 24.81
750.000 — 800,000 lbs . 21.55 24.43 24.99
800,000 - 850,000 lbs . 21.63 24.61 25.17
850.000 — 900,000 lbs. 21.72 24.79 25.35
900,000 — 950,000 lbs. 21.80 24.97 25.53
950,000 - 1 .000,000 lbs. 21.89a 2 5.15b 25.71b
Minimum Day 21.78 — 23 .30C
Article 1
Breaking in engines for service, per hour .... 2.63-3/4
Deadheading on company business ................ 20.01
Jull snow plow, per hour ........................  2.86-1/4
Watching engines, per hour.......................  2 .62-3/4
Chicago elec. suburban serv., per 100 m i .......20.80
Article 6
Overtime, per hour ............................... 2.58-1/4
Overtime, per hour, Chicago suburban service . 2,72
aWith 8<£ and 9d alternately added for each additional 
50,000 lbs. or fraction thereof.
■^With 18d added for each additional 50,000 lbs., or 
fraction thereof.
cAlso applicable to work train service— not appli­
cable to any runs now subject to other guarantees.
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APPENDIX D
AVERAGE SPEED OF COAL RUN 
PADUCAH, K Y .-BLUFORD, ILL.*
Date Hours Miles
Average
Speed
Avq.
Full
too. cars 
Empty
April 16 4:35 95 .07 21.86 mph 195 29
April 17 4 :20 95 .07 22.64 177 22
April 18 5 :25 95.07 18.11 29 0
April 19 4:30 95 .07 22 .11 185 20
April 19 4 :00 95.07 23 .77 185 21
April 20 3 :35 95.07 28.38 184 17
April 20 4:50 95.07 21.13 205 17
April 21 3 :33 95.07 28.55 164 43
April 21 4:55 95’. 07 20.89 190 17
Average 4:39 23.09 mph
*From Trainmaster's "Train-sheets," April 16-21,
1961.
170
APPENDIX E
ANNUAL EARNINGS OF NON-SUPERVISORY 
EMPLOYEES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES 
YEAR 1960a
Classification
Avg.
Weekly
Earnings
A vg. 
Hourly 
Earnings
Avg.
Annual
Earnings
Flat Glass $127.35 $3 .16 $6 620 .70
Petroleum Refining 123 .22 3 .02 6 407 .44
Engine and Turbines 120.90 3 .00 6 286 .80
Tires and Inner Tubes 116 .33 2 .96 6 039 .16
Blast Furnaces and Basic Steel 116.13 3 .04 6 034 .76
Motor Vehicles 118 .20 2 .89 6 146 .40
All Class I Railroads 108.84 2 .61 5 659.68
b
Motor Freight Transportation 104.17 2 .51 5 416.84
Steel Foundries 101.66 2 .60 5 366.32
Fabricated Metal Products 98 .82 2 .44 5 128.64
Electrical Equipment and Supplies 30 .74 2 .28 4 718.48
aSource: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings Statistics for the United States, 1909-60. (Wash­
ington: United States Department of Labor, Bulletin No.
1312, 1961).
^Statistics on Air Transportation not available.
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